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ABSTRACT
Analysis of DPA and DEMA Attacks
by Cheuk Wong

Side channel attacks (SCA) are attacks on the implementations of cryptographic
algorithms or cryptography devices that do not employ full brute force attack or
exploit the weaknesses of the algorithms themselves. There are mant types of side
channel attacks, and they include timing, sound, power consumptions, electromagnetic (EM) radiations, and more. A statistical side channel attack technique that uses
power consumption and EM readings was developed, and they are called Diﬀerential
Power Analysis (DPA) and Diﬀerential Electromagnetic Analysis respectively.
DPA takes the overall power consumption readings from the system of interest,
and DEMA takes a localized EM readings from the system of interest. In this project,
we will examine the eﬀectiveness of both techniques and compare the results. We will
compare the techniques based on the amount of resource and time they needed to
perform a successful SCA on the same system. In addition, we will attempt to use a
radio receiver to down mix the power consumption readings and the EM readings to
reduce the amount of computing resources it takes to perform SCA. We will provide
our test results of performing SCA with DPA and DEMA, and we will also compare
the results to determine the eﬀectiveness of the two techniques.
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CHAPTER 1
Cryptography

In cryptography, hardware implementations of cryptographic algorithms are used
to speed up the encryption and decryption processes [7, 9, 17]. Cryptographic algorithms commonly used in everyday practices are DES, 3DES, AES, and RSA.
While these algorithms are mathematical secured, the hardware implementations can
sometime unintentionally leak informations regarding the implementation of the algorithms, the data being encrypted, or even the secret keys. The process of attacking
the algorithms from these leaked information is called side channel attack, and two of
the most commonly used side channel attacks are by obtaining the power consumption readings and electromagnetic ﬁeld changes during cryptographic operations on
the hardware implementations [1, 2, 3]. This paper will compare the eﬃciencies of
using the power consumption model and electromagnetic ﬁeld model as side channel
attacks on embedded systems. The motivation of this project is to determine the best
method of performing side channel attack on embedded systems. If we can determine
the best method of performing side channel attack on embedded system, then we can
begin the attack with such method and not spend time trying to ﬁgure out which
method is viable and which is not.

1.1

Cryptographic Algorithms

Cryptography is the practice of communicating in secrets. The basic idea of cryptography is to allow two parties to securely communicate, so no other party can read
the messages between the two parties [10]. A message is referred as plain text, and
an encryption algorithm transforms a plain text into cipher text. A cipher text is
1

unreadable unless the decryption algorithm is applied. A good encryption algorithm
will produce a seemingly random cipher text by employing confusion and diﬀusion
techniques. Confusion is to obscure the relationship between the plain text and the
cipher text, and diﬀusion is to spread the statistical information of the plain text all
around the cipher text.

A cryptographic algorithm can be thought of as a pair of mathematical functions.
The ﬁrst function is the encryption algorithm, and it takes two arguments, the plain
text and a secret key, and produces the cipher text. The second function is the decryption function, and it takes the cipher text and the secret key as arguments and
produces the plain text. If the secret key matches, the encryption and decryption
functions can be thought of as inverse function of each others. According to Kerckhoﬀ’s principle, the strength of a cryptographic algorithm should only be dependent
on the length of the secret key, and it is assumed that the cryptographic algorithm is
known by everyone [10].

There are two types of cryptographic algorithms, and they are symmetric key cipher
and asymmetric keys cipher. In a symmetric key cipher, both parties share the same
secret key for encryption and decryption. Some of the most popular symmetric key
ciphers are DES, 3DES, and AES. On the other hands, an asymmetric key cipher,
or often referred as public key encryption, uses a key for encryption and a diﬀerent
key for decryption. The key for encryption is often referred as the public key since
it is designed to be made public so that anyone can use it to encrypt messages. The
decryption key is often referred as the private key since the encrypted messages should
only be able to be decrypted by the person with the private key. Two of the most
popular asymmetric key ciphers are RSA and ECC.
2

1.1.1

DES

Data Encryption Standard (DES) is a symmetric key block cipher that was ﬁrst
selected by the National Bureau of Standards, now the National Institute of Standards
and Technology, as the oﬃcial Federal Information Processing Standard in 1976 [12].
DES was developed by a team from IBM, and it was based on an earlier cipher called
Lucifer. The National Security Agency (NSA) was also involved in the ﬁnal design of
DES, and it was later discovered that the NSA’s involvement actually helped increase
the strength of the cipher by the means of diﬀerential cryptanalysis [10].

DES is a 64 bits key block cipher with a block size of 64 bits. However, only 56
bits of the key is actually used, and every 8th bits of the key serves as a parity check
of the previous 7 bits and is discarded during the cryptographic operations. Thus the
eﬀective key length of DES is only 56 bits. Since the eﬀective key length of DES is
only 56 bits, it is susceptible to brute force attacks with this key length. There are
some successful brute force attacks that run in less than a day on modern machines
[14]. DES has been widely adopted since its inception, and there are many hardware
speciﬁcally designed to implement the DES algorithm to speed up the encryption
and decryption processes. In order to extend the life time of these hardware while
not adopting to other more secured ciphers, DES users adopted the use Triple DES,
or sometime referred as 3DES. Triple DES can either have a set of two 56 bits keys
or a set of three 56 bits keys [13]. In the two keys scheme, the plain text is ﬁrst
encrypted with key number one, then it is decrypted with key number two, and it is
ﬁnally encrypted with key number one again. In the other scheme, the plain text is
encrypted with key one, then it is decrypted with key two, and it is encrypted with
key number three. The plain text is recovered from the cipher text by applying the
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decryption function, encryption function, and decryption function again with the keys
in reverse order in which they were applied during the encryption phase. Triple DES
allows users to keep using their old hardware accelerator while increase the eﬀective
key length to either 112 bits or 168 bits depending on the Triple DES scheme used.
Although DES and 3DES is a popular cipher, we will not be performing side channel
attack on DES or 3DES, and we will being performing side channel attacks AES.

1.1.2

AES

Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is a symmetric key block cipher. AES was
adopted in order to replace DES. AES was originally called the Rijndael cipher and
was developed by two Belgian cryptographers. The Rijndael cipher was submitted
as part of the AES selection process. In November 2001, AES was announced by
the National Institute of Standards and Technology as the winner of the selection
process. In addition, the NSA also approved AES for protecting documents as high
up in the classiﬁcation level as top secret [18].

As mentioned before, AES is a block cipher, and it has a ﬁxed block size of 128
bits, and the key length can be 128 bits, 192 bits, or 256 bits. Unlike its predecessor
DES, AES is not a Feistel cipher meaning that the plain text is not divided into two
halves and swapped during each round. On the other hands, AES does have many
identical rounds, and the number of rounds depends on the key size: ten rounds for
a 128 bits key, twelves rounds for a 192 bits key, and fourteen rounds for a 256 bits
key. The S-box used in AES is called the Rijndael S-box, and it is used in both the
key scheduling algorithm and the round function. The Rijndael S-box is generated
by ﬁnding the multiplicative inverse for a given number in the Rijndael’s ﬁnite ﬁeld
denoted by GF (28 ), and the multiplication operation is multiplication of polynomials
4

modulo of m(x) = x8 + x4 + x3 + x + 1, which is an irreducible polynomial of degree
8 [10, 18].

In AES, everything is put into a four by four matrix of bytes called the state, and
there are four common operations that operate on the state throughout the entire
AES algorithm. The ﬁrst operation is called the AddRoundKey, and the AddRoundKey operation takes the subkey, derived from the main key using the Rijndael’s key
scheduling algorithm, and XOR each byte in the state. The second operation is called
SubBytes, and it is simply looking up each byte in the state and replacing it with the
values found in the Rijndael S-box. Similar to DES, the Rijndael’s S-box introduced
non-linear operations into the algorithm. The next operation is called the ShiftRows.
As the name implies, each rows in the state is being shifted. The ﬁrst row doesn’t
change; the second row is shifted to the left by one; the third row is shifted to the
left by two; and forth row is shifted to the left by three. Finally, the last operation
is called MixColumns, and each column in the state is being multiplied by a known
matrix depending on the key size. All the operations are depicted in ﬁgure 1 This
operation is closely relately to the Rijndael ﬁnite ﬁeld, and the multiplication is actually a valid operation in the Rijndael ﬁnite ﬁeld. For each AES encryption, there is
an initial round, a ﬁnal round, and the ten, or twelves, or fourteen rounds functions.
The initial round consists only of a single AddRoundKey operation, and the ﬁnal
round consists of one of SubBytes, ShiftRows, and AddRoundKey operations. Each
of the round function will have all four operations described earlier [18].

Due to its key size, it is infeasible to perform a brute force attack on AES. A known
attack on AES is a related key attack on both the 192 bit and 256 bit version of AES
[19]. The complexity of this attack is of 2100 computations. Other known successful
5

Figure 1: The operations of AES: SubBytes, ShiftRows, MixColumns, and AddRoundKey
attacks on implementations of AES are side channel attacks where information leaked
from the implementation of the algorithm is used to recover the secret key [1, 3]. These
side channel attacks are completely dependent of the implementation, and some of
these attacks are also chosen plain text attacks. However, the attackers need to be
able to have access to the hardware in order to perform the side channel attacks
successfully.
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CHAPTER 2
Side Channel Attacks

Side channel attacks are attacks on the hardware implementations of cryptographic
algorithms or cryptography devices that do not employ full brute force attack or
exploit the weaknesses of the algorithms themselves. In general, the goal of side
channel attacks is to gain the secret information, such as the secret key, from the
cryptography device with the information leakage due to its implementation on the
system. There are numerous successful side channel attacks that can be used to
recover the secrets stored within a cryptography system that uses secured algorithms
such as AES and RSA [24].

2.1

Timing

One side channel attack on a cryptography system is to measure the time it takes for
a cryptography system to perform a computation. The assumption in a timing attack
is that the computation is data dependent, and the attacker can recover the data based
on the amount of time that the system takes to performance the calculation. A simple
example is a program that takes a series of bits as input and perform calculations
based on each bit. The program, however, would take longer to calculate the result if
the bit is one. The attackers can recover the input bit by bit from judging the timing
of the calculation; if the calculation was short, then the bit is zero, otherwise the bit
is one. Another example is pin number validation. A naive approach to write a pin
validation program is to check the input bytes one at a time against the correct pin
number, and if there is a diﬀerence between the input and the correct pin number,
then the program would terminate. Since a correct ﬁrst byte means that the program
7

will check the second byte, the calculation would take sightly longer for a correct
ﬁrst byte input versus an incorrect ﬁrst byte input. Thus, the attack can mount a
timing attack to determine the correct pin number by testing the all possible ﬁrst
byte until a longer calculation is measured, and repeat until all the pin numbers have
been revealed. In reality, a successful timing attack was used to recover a server’s
private key that uses RSA [25].

2.2

Sound

Another side channel attack is the use of sound as a channel of attack. The sound
that hardware produces can leak information regarding the secret information. Primitive examples are keyboard and key pads. In keyboards or key pads, each key produces
a diﬀerent sound, and an attacker can record the sound that the keyboard or key pad
makes and determine the keys pressed. The attackers can determine users’ passwords
if they managed to capture the sound that the keyboards or key pads make during the
time when the users entered their passwords. A more sophisticated sound based side
channel attack was demonstrated by Adi Shamir by capturing the humming emission produced by the capacitors surrounding the processing unit that is performing
cryptographic operations [26].

2.3

Power Consumption

A more complex form of the timing based side channel attack is taking the power
consumption reading of the system of interest while performing cryptographic operations [1]. Like the temperature based attacks, the attackers simply record the power
reading during cryptographic operations, and attackers can use that information to
determine the secret hidden within the system. Since most modern cryptographic
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devices are implemented using transistors, a charge will be applied, or removed, from
the transistors when electrons ﬂow through the transistors. This change in charge
can be detected and can leak secret information. The leakage occurs due to diﬀerent
transistors becoming active, or inactive, based on the secret information [2]. The
attackers do not necessary needed to know the details regarding the system of interests. In fact, the system of interests can be a black box, and the attack will still be
successful.

There are two types of power consumption based side channel attacks, and they are
Simple Power Analysis (SPA) and Diﬀerential Power Analysis (DPA). Both of them
were ﬁrst introduced by Paul Kocher in 1998 [2]. The details of these two types of
attacks will be discussed more in section 4.1.

2.4

Electromagnetic

Using electromagnetic ﬁeld as a channel for side channel attacks is closely related
to using power reading. While a power based side channel attack take the power
measurements from the entire system of interests, an electromagnetic based attack
localizes on the area of where the measurements will take place, such as where the
cryptographic functional unit resides. Since the measurements are taken at a speciﬁc location, a specialized probe is generally needed in order to the take the measurements. Once again, the leakage of information occurs due to electrons ﬂowing
through the transistors, and the act of electrons passing through the transistors will
also produce electromagnetic radiation which the probe can detect [1, 3]. In addition,
the location of the measurements has to be very precises in order to get any useful
information.
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Similar to the power based side channel attacks, there are two types of attacks, and
they are Simple Electromagnetic Analysis (SEMA) and Diﬀerential Electromagnetic
Analysis (DEMA) [3]. However, there is no conclusive evidences to show that whether
a power based or a electromagnetic based side channel attack is more eﬀective or vise
versa [31, 32].
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CHAPTER 3
SPA and SEMA
3.1

SPA

Simple Power Analysis, or SPA for short, is a power based side channel attack. In
an SPA attack, attackers take the power measurements from the system of interests
while it is performing cryptographic operations, or other operations of interest, and
the attackers would visually inspect, or apply a template attack on, the power readings
and determine the information leakage. A power measurements over a ﬁxed period
of time is usually referred as a trace [2]. It should be noted that SPA only requires
a small amount of traces, and it usually takes less than a thousand traces in order
to perform an SPA attack. If a successful attack only required one trace, and it is
referred as a single-shot SPA attack; and if a successful attack required more than
one trace, then it is called a multiple-shot SPA attack. In a multiple-shot SPA attack,
the attacker can either supply the cryptographic system with either the same plain
text or diﬀerent plain text for each traces. The advantage of doing a multiple-shot
SPA attack is to reduce the noises within the traces and get a clearer picture of what
is happening in the system from the traces [1].

One of the base assumption of SPA is that the cryptographic operations of interests
is running in sequential order. Under this assumption, a power trace will contain the
power in terms of voltage on the Y-axis, and the X-axis will be time. For example,
AES consists one or more of four general operations in each round. Recall that the
four operations are AddRoundKey, SubBytes, ShiftRows, and MixColumn, and each
of these operations will produce unique signatures within the power traces. Since the
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algorithm will run in sequential order, and there are at least ten repetitive round of
these four operations. Thus it is easy to identify the AES operations in the power
trace if the attackers simply look for these ten unique signatures for software implementation of AES. In addition, attackers can also learn the information about the
implementation of the algorithms solely based on the power traces [11]. For example,
a system will require less clock cycles to access internal memory than accessing external memory; and the system performing input/output operations will draw more
power than simple operations. Finally, if the operations of algorithms of interests is
data dependent, such as the input secret key, then it is possible to obtain the data just
by exampling the power traces [1]. On the other hands, the electromagnetic counter
part of SPA is Simple Electromagnetic Analysis.

3.2

SEMA

Simple Electromagnetic Analysis, or SEMA for short, is a side channel attack
that reads the electromagnetic ﬁeld from the circuit that is being attacked. SEMA
is very similar to SPA; SEMA attacks take the electromagnetic ﬁeld reading from
the circuit while it is performing cryptographic operations [3, 4]. The attacker will
visually inspect the electromagnetic traces and determine the parts of the traces
that correspond to the cryptographic operations performed, and the attacker will
eventually discover the secret key based on these traces. However, SEMA attacks
is localized to only a small portion of the circuits, so an extra step of ﬁnding out
where the area of interested on the circuits is needed. Locating the area of interests
on a circuit is done by forcing the cryptographic device to run in a loop while the
electromagnetic probe takes partial snap shops of the circuit during each cycle of the
loop. Once a susceptible area has been identiﬁed, the search will be reﬁned to that
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area [1].

Unlike SPA or DPA that can obtain traces by simply measuring the power consumption of a system by measuring either ends of the power source of the system,
SEMA requires a specialized electromagnetic probe to take precise measurements.
An inductive probe will be used for performing SEMA attacks; an inductive probe
is simply a wire looped into coils, and the coils’ diameter can range from 150 to 500
microns. When an electromagnetic ﬁeld passes through the coils, the coils will act
like an inductor and will induce current through the wire, and the strength of the
electromagnetic ﬁeld can be measured from the wire. When a transistor switches from
a zero to a one or vice versa, a short current pulse is produced and can cause the
surrounding electromagnetic ﬁeld to ﬂuctuate, and this ﬂuctuation can be detected
by using the inductive probe. This ﬂuctuation can be a form of information leakage.
This leakage of information can correlate the transition’s Hamming distance [3].
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CHAPTER 4
DPA and DEMA
4.1

DPA

Diﬀerential Power Analysis, or DPA for short, is a popular type of power analysis
attacks on cryptographic system [2]. The main reason for DPA’s popularity comes
from the advantage of not requiring the detail knowledge of the system of interests,
and the attacker only needs to know the algorithm that is being employed on the system. However, thousands of traces are needed in order for the attack to be successful
with noisy signals. In general, DPA pre-computes a series of possible power traces
and compares these power traces against the actually power traces taken. The traces
with the highest correlation will most likely reveal the key [1].

DPA consists of ﬁve steps. The ﬁrst step is to choose an intermediate result of the
cryptographic algorithm running on the system. The intermediate result should be a
function in the cryptographic algorithm, and a series of chosen plain text and possible
values of the secret key should be used to applied to the function in the later steps.
One example of a function is the Sbox in either DES or AES. The next step is to take
the actual power traces with the cryptographic system, and the attacker should use all
the chosen plain text from step one. The trace is then divided based on the operations
of the cryptographic algorithm observed. From this step, the matrix T is created
from the power traces and the recorded data values from applying the encryption
or decryption function, and it is important that all the column should correspond
to the same operations. The next step is to calculate the hypothetical intermediate
values. The end result of this step is also a matrix, V . The attacker calculates all the
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possible parts of the secret key. The entries in V would be applying the intermediate
value function chosen and the chosen plain text from step one with these hypothetical
keys. Hence, entry vi,j = f (di , kj where i = 1, ..., D and j = 1, ..., K), where D are
the intermediate values from step 1 and K are all the possible partial key values. The
fourth step in DPA is to take the matrix V and map it to the power consumption
values and produce the matrix H. In this step, the attacker uses simulation to
obtain the hypothetical power consumption based on the hypothetical intermediate
values. This simulation is usually done with the help of a power model, and the most
commonly used power models are Hamming distance and Hamming weights. Each
entry of H, hi,j , is simulated from vi,j The last step of DPA is performing statistical
analysis between the matrix H and the matrix T . The analysis is done column
wise, and a high correlation between a column on H and T means the corresponding
key hypothesis from that column is most likely be the partial key used during the
encryption phase [1]. Figure 2 shows step 3 to 5 in picture form.

The more measurements that the attacker makes during step two, the more likely
that the attacker will be able to the recover the key [11]. If it is the case that all
the correlation values on a column are all very similar, then it is most likely the case
that the attacker has not taken enough measurements to draw a strong correlation
between the key hypothesis and the actual key, and the other possibility is that the
key hypothesis is wrong [1]. In our experiments, we want to record the time it takes for
full key recovery, and the measurement of time includes acquisitions and the analysis
phase. Realistically, an attack would to be able to perform full key recovery in less
than a day, and perform full key recovery in less than an hour in some cases.

15

Figure 2: Depiction of the steps in DPA
4.2

DEMA

Diﬀerential Electromagnetic Analysis, or DEMA for short, is similar to DPA except
with electromagnetic readings instead of power readings. Much like DPA, DEMA follows the same ﬁve steps to determine the secret key in a cryptographic system. Rather
than exploiting the relationship between power consumption and the data being processed, DEMA takes a localized reading of the electromagnetic ﬁeld of the circuit.
There has been successful DEMA attacks against an FPGA based DES and ECC
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cryptographic system with less than ten thousands traces [6, 8]. In addition, there
are also successful attacks on systems that perform AES encryption [5]. Currently, it
is unknown whether DPA or DEMA is more eﬃcient in obtaining the secret key from
an embedded cryptographic system [3].

4.3

SPA vs DPA

The major diﬀerence between SPA and DPA is the number of traces required in
each attack. In general, SPA requires only a small amount of traces, and the number
of traces is usually less than a thousand. On the other hands, DPA requires thousands of traces, and DPA sometime required up to the range of millions traces [11].
Furthermore, SPA usually requires the attacker to know some detail implementation
of the cryptographic system whereas attacker using DPA can treat the cryptographic
system as a black box [1].

4.4

Power Models

As mentioned before in section 4.1, there are two commonly used power models
for DPA, and they are Hamming weight and Hamming distance. Hamming distance
is the number of diﬀerent symbols in the same position between two same length
strings. Hamming weight is the number of diﬀerent symbols in the same position
between a strings and a string of the same length with all symbols being zeros. If a
better the model is used during DPA, then the amount of traces required to mount
a successful attack is reduced. Both Hamming weight and distance can be used for
attacking microcontroller made with CMOS technology [1].
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4.5

Correlation Coeﬃcient

Correlation coeﬃcient is the most common way to determine the linear relationship
between two values. The one of most eﬀective method of calculating the correlation
coeﬃcient between two values is the Pearson’s product-moment coeﬃcient given by:
∑D

¯

d=1 (hd,i −hi ×(td,j −tj ))
¯ 2 ∑D
¯ 2
d=1 (hd,i −hi ) × d=1 (td,j −tj )

ri,j = √∑D

¯

where hi , ti denotes the ith columns of the H and T

matrix described earlier, and h̄i denotes the mean values of the columns. A coeﬃcient
of either a -1 or 1 means a strong correlation between the values, and a coeﬃcient
of zero means the values are completely independent of each other. The Pearson’s
product-moment coeﬃcient is used for DPA because it can be calculated quickly [1].

4.6

DPA on AES

Performing DPA on diﬀerent cryptographic algorithms requires diﬀerent approaches. For instance, the DES algorithm states that only 48 bits of the key are
used in the ﬁrst round, and the remaining 8 bits of the key are used in the second
round along with other bits of the key [12]. Thus, two rounds of DPA are needed in
order to achieve full key recovery for DES. As for AES, all bits of the key are used
in the ﬁrst round of the encryption algorithm, so only one round of DPA is needed
in order to achieve full key recovery [18]. Recall that AES has four main operations
within each round function, and ﬁrst operation is the SubByte operation. The SubByte operation takes each byte in the state and replace it with a value from the Sbox.
During DPA, the hypothetical intermediate values matrix, V , is calculated based on
the SubByte operation. Depending on the implementation of the AES algorithm,
the Hamming Weight or the Hamming Distance for the change in values before and
after the Sbox substitution can be leaked, so the intermediate value function is the
SubByte in terms of DPA. The matrix V contains all the possible key bytes based on
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the chosen plain text applying to the SubByte function. The rest of the DPA follows
as described in the earlier section.

4.7

Countermeasures

Countermeasures are techniques that used to prevent side channel attacks. There
are many ways to set up countermeasures on a device, and countermeasures can be
done on the software side as well as the hardware side. The main goal of countermeasure is to minimize the amount of information leakage. More speciﬁcally, countermeasures make the power measurements, electromagnetic measurements, timing,
or any other side channels be independent of the data processed. Some of the most
common techniques for countermeasures are hiding, masking, dummy instruction
insertion, randomized delays, non-deterministic computations, rail logic, and many
more [4, 11]. In this project, we will not be concerning about any countermeasures
that may arise from the embedded system.
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CHAPTER 5
Experiments

In this paper, we will run several sets of experiments. The ﬁrst set of experiments
will be performing DEMA on an embedded system. This set of experiment will
consist of using high and low sensitivity probes with diﬀerent conﬁgurations. The
diﬀerent conﬁgurations consist of using hardware ﬁlters and performing DEMA at
diﬀerent locations on the embedded system. We want to see the eﬀects of using high
and low sensitivity probes as well as the eﬀects of the diﬀerent conﬁgurations. The
next set of experiments is performing DPA on the same embedded system. This
set will be divided into performing DPA with a power probe and a current probe.
The experiments with the power probe will be measuring the strength of resistor in
relationship with eﬀectiveness of DPA; the results will be compared to the results
of experimenting with the current probe. We will then compare the best results of
DEMA and DPA to see which method is better for performing side channel analysis
on embedded systems.

In addition to performing known side channel attack methods, we will be performing
side channel attacks with the aid of a radio receiver. The goal of performing the
experiments with a radio receiver is to see if we can reduce the total time of performing
side channel attacks by reducing the amount of data with the radio receiver. We will
repeat the experiments with DEMA and DPA with the radio receiver and see if there
are any improvements in our results.
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CHAPTER 6
Embedded Cryptographic Systems

In this project, we will be performing DPA on an embedded system that performs
cryptographic operations. The system of interest is the ATXmega256A3B designed
by Atmel, and we will be using an evaluation board for this project.

6.1

Atmel AVR ATXmega256A3B

For our experiments, we will be using the ATXmega256A3B embedded microprocessor. The Xmega family is designed and produced by Atmel. The ATXmega256A3B
is designed for large range of applications included but not limited to building, industrial, motor, board, climate control, hand-held battery applications, networking
and home appliances, and medical devices. The ATXmega256A3B has a total of 64
pins with a max I/O pins of 47. The main CPU of the chip is an 8 bit AVR. In
terms of memory, the ATXmega256A3B has 256 KB of in-system self-programmable
Flash, 8 KB of boot code sections with lock bits, 4 KB of EEPROM, and 16 KB of
internal SRAM. In addition, the chip has a set of internal 32 KHz, 2 MHz, and 32
MHz oscillators operating at 3.3 V and 150 mA. Finally, the chip has a cryptographic
engine that can perform DES and AES which would be useful for this project [27].
The ATXmega256A3B microprocessor will simply be referred as Xmega from this
point on.

6.2

Implementation of AES on ATXmega256A3B

The implementation of AES on the Xmega is hardware based, and the AES hardware accelerator is directly connected to the main CPU of the chip as shown in ﬁgure
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3 [28]. However, the block diagram does not show us where the cryptographic accelerator is physically located for DEMA since the block diagram does not translate to
physical layout, and locating the cryptographic accelerator will be the ﬁrst step in
DEMA. The AES and DES engine can be accessed via software from a couple of lines
of code. The programmer only needs to supply the key, plain text, and a buﬀer to
store the cipher text for encryption. The AVR code loaded onto the Xmega for our
experiments is provided in the appendix. The AES accelerator can only do 128-bit
key encryption/decryption with 128-bit plain text blocks. It also supports XOR data
load mode to the state memory for cipher block chaining (CBC). The encryption and
decryption are performed in 375 clock cycles per 16-byte blocks [28].
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Figure 3: ATXmega256A3B Block Diagram
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CHAPTER 7
General set up of the attack
The set up of the attack will be simple. First and fore most, a PC will be set up with
Inspector. Inspector is a platform designed to analysis signals developed by Riscure.
Inspector has many preloaded modules for signal processing for performing DEMA
and DPA for DES, 3DES, AES, RSA, and ECC, and the modules can be modiﬁed to
suits our needs. The PC is wired to an oscilloscope, and we will be using a LeCroy
610zi and/or Picoscope 5203 to capture signals. The oscilloscope is wired to the EM
probe or power tracer directly. In addition, the PC will also be communicating with
the system of interest in order to trigger cryptographic operations. Figure 4 shows a
generic set up of the attack.

Figure 4: Generic set up diagram for SCA

In order for the PC to take a trace, it begins by sending the system of interest a
command. The command contains the opcode for encryption and parameters (such
as data to encrypt, mode of encryption, etc), and this will force the system of interest
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into performing cryptographic operations. This step is shown in number 1 of ﬁgure
4. At the same time, the PC will send a trigger to the oscilloscope to begin recording
the signals from either the power probe or the EM probe. This is shown in number
2 of ﬁgure 4. Once the cryptographic operations have ﬁnished, the oscilloscope will
send the signals to the PC and a trace containing the signal, plain text and cipher
text will be recorded (Number 4a/b in ﬁgure 4). Ideally, the trigger will be set to
begin right before the cryptographic operations start and the signal will end right as
the cryptographic operations end. However, ﬁne tunings will needed to be made in
order to produce well aligned trace set. As mentioned before in section 4.1, the more
traces that the attacker can acquire the more likely that the attacker will be able to
obtain the secret key.

Once we have a trace set, we will begin our analysis phase. Assuming the trace
set is sampled at 1GHz, the ﬁrst step in our analysis phase is to determine which
frequencies show the most activities. We can determine this by running the trace set
on the Spectrum module of Inspector. Further details about the Spectrum module
will be described in section 9.3.1. Once we ﬁgured out which frequencies are the
most active in the trace set, we will resample the trace set to these frequencies and
produce new trace sets. Resampling means applying a low pass ﬁlter to the data
and change the sampling rate of the signal. A low pass ﬁlter will only allow low
frequencies signal to pass through, thus eliminating all the high frequency signals.
The next step in the analysis phase is to align the trace set at the important section
(e.g. during the ﬁrst round of AES encryption). We can achieve this by the means
of the Static Alignment module of Inspector. The details of this module will be
discussed in section 9.3.1. We can determine which section of the trace is important
by either visual inspection, running the data correlation module (details in section
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9.3.1), or the KnownKeyCorrelation module if we know the key (details in section
11.2). Finally, we will perform DPA/DEMA on the trace set

7.1

Expectation

In this project, the main goal is to compare and contrast the eﬀectiveness of DPA
and DEMA on embedded systems. One of the methods of determining which analysis
technique is more eﬀective is by the number of traces required in order to the break
the cryptography. The signal measurement technique that requires less traces will
be the more eﬀective technique. From previous experience, we would expect DPA to
require less number of traces in order to successfully perform the attack than DEMA.
This is due to the noise capture by the EM probes that causes the traces in DEMA
to be more noisy. As a result, DEMA needs more traces in order to cancel out the
noises.

7.2

Locating the X-Y Coordinate of the Crypto Block

Upon learning the implementation of AES of the embedded system, we can begin
the attack on the embedded system by physically locating where the cryptographic
operation is being performed on the chip. This step is important in order to perform DEMA on the embedded system. Recall that DEMA requires very localized
electromagnetic readings on the system of interest, thus we will need to know the
physical location of the cryptographic operation before we can perform DEMA on
the embedded system.

To set up this step in the process, we will ﬁrst force the embedded system to continuously perform cryptographic operations in a loop. This can be done by the means
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of sending commands to the system, wait for a respond, and repeat. The next step is
to divide the chip into 10 by 10 equal sections and begin taking raw electromagnetic
measurements of each section while running the cryptographic loop. By adjusting
the measurements to only ﬁlter to the frequency in which the cryptographic blocks
operate in, we can see the hot spots that correspond to the area of the cryptographic
engine. We can narrow the area down by performing the measurements in a smaller
area around the hot spot until we can identify where exactly is the cryptographic
blocks are. The full detail on how this is done on the Xmega will be described in
section 9.1.

7.3

Setting up the trigger

The next step, in both DEMA and DPA, is set up a good trigger. An ideal trigger
will allow the attacker to take traces that start at the exact moment when the cryptographic operations start and end at the moment when the cryptographic operations
end. A hardware trigger is chosen for this project since we have full access to the
hardware, and we can load any ﬁrmware we desired. The full detail of this trigger
will be described in section 9.2.
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CHAPTER 8
Smart Triggering

In side channel attacks, setting up a good trigger is very important, and a good
trigger can reduce the time it takes to perform side channel attacks. A perfect trigger
can caused all the traces to be aligned without any modiﬁcations to the trace set. By
eliminating the alignment phase during the acquisition phase, the attacker can save
time by not performing alignment on the trace set. However, a perfect trigger is hard
to obtain unless the attacker has full control of the hardware. We will discuss how
we set up our trigger for the Xmega, and we will discuss a new approach to ﬁnding a
good trigger.

The icWaves is an Inspector module that is designed speciﬁcally for setting up a
good trigger. Referring to ﬁgure 4, the icWaves will reside between 2 and 3. The
signal from the probe will go directly to the scope as well as the icWaves. The trigger
line, number 3 in the ﬁgure, will go directly to the icWaves, and the icWaves has it
own trigger line that goes into the scope. The attacker can load a reference pattern as
large as 256 samples onto the icWaves via Inspector. During acquisition, icWaves will
compare the incoming signal from the probe to the reference pattern. The comparison
that the icWaves makes is sum of absolute diﬀerence (SAD). Note the two very similar
patterns will have a SAD value close to zero, so identical patterns will have a SAD
value of zero. The icWaves will send a signal out of its trigger port connected to the
scope if the calculated SAD value is below a certain threshold set by the attacker.
The biggest problem with using the icWaves for triggering is ﬁnding a good reference
pattern.
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In this section, we will discuss a new Inspector module that allows us to ﬁnd a
good reference pattern, and we will also discuss the performance and accuracy of this
module. The goal of this module is to determine the best 256 samples pattern to load
into the icWaves as the reference trace given a trace set. The input of this module
will be a set of aligned traces, and the output of the module will be a 256 samples
pattern with a suggested threshold for the icWaves. The chosen area, by the user,
from the input trace set will be used to generate patterns as candidates for triggering,
and we will refer this area as inside from now on. The only additional options that
the user can decide for this module is the oﬀset. The oﬀset will aﬀect the pattern
generation and the SAD calculations.

We will demonstrate how the oﬀset works by describing how the pattern generation
works with two diﬀerent oﬀsets. The user can choose to use the following oﬀsets: 1,
64, 128, and 256. Let T be a trace set with 100 traces, and each tn ∈ T trace has
30000 samples. Let the range of samples [1000, 3000] be the inside area selected by
the user. If the oﬀset is 1, then the pattern set, P , will consist of the followings:
p1 = [1000, 1255], p2 = [1001, 1256], p3 = [1002, 1257]..., pm = [2744, 3000] from trace
0 of T . If the oﬀset is 256, then the pattern set, P , will consist of the followings:
p1 = [1000, 1255], p2 = [1256, 1512], p3 = [1513, 1768]..., pm = [2536, 2792] from trace
0 of T . Each of these patterns will be a candidate for the ﬁnal output of the module.
Once the module has generated the patterns, it will begin to perform the SAD value
calculations against the other traces.

The SAD calculations can be optimized from the brute force method, and we will
describe the brute force method and the optimized method for oﬀset less than or equal
to 128. Let T be a trace set containing n traces, and each trace contains k samples.
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From the user’s selection, the algorithm was able to produce m patterns. Let SAD()
denotes the sum of absolute diﬀerence function between two arrays of numbers of the
same size, and let tn [i, j] denotes the samples ranged from i to j in the trace tn .

8.1

Brute Force Method

In this section, we will discuss the brute force method of calculating the SAD values.
For this discussion, we will assume the oﬀset is 1. For each tn ∈ T , for each pm ∈ P ,
calculate SAD(tn [0, 255], pm ), SAD(tn [1, 256], pm ), ... SAD(tn [k − 256, k], pm ). The
run time of the brute force algorithm is O(n3 ) where n is the number of samples in a
trace.

8.2

Optimized SAD Calculations

In this section, we will discuss the optimized method of calculating the SAD values.
For this discussion, we will assume the oﬀset is 1. There are two optimizations that
we can employ. Assuming that the user selected i to j from the trace, then the ﬁrst
optimization that we can employ is to calculate SAD values only up to j. For example,
if the user selects the samples from 2000 to 3256, then perform SAD calculations on
the followings: SAD(tn [0, 255], pm ), SAD(tn [1, 256], pm ), ... , SAD(tn [3000, 3256], pm )
for each tn ∈ T , for each pm ∈ P . We can do this because we are not interested in
any pattern that can trigger beyond the selected area, and any triggering happens
beyond the selected area is already too late for any useful eﬀect.

The second optimization comes from an observation that a lot of the SAD calculations are being repeated. For example, given a trace t and a pattern set P , and
assuming oﬀset is 1, note the following observation: s0 = SAD(t[0, 255], p0 ), s1 =
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SAD(t[1, 256], p1 ) = s0 - |t[0] − p0 [0]| + |t[256] − p1 [256]|. Thus, the following algorithm can be used for calculating the SAD values: for each t ∈ T ; let i = 0, calculate
s0 = SAD(t[i, i + 256], p0 ), s1 = s0 - |t[i] − p0 [0]| + |t[i + 256] − p1 [256]|, s2 = s1 |t[i + 1] − p1 [0]| + |t[i + 257] − p2 [256]|, ... etc, then increment i by 1 and repeat until
done. The run time of the optimized algorithm is O(n2 ) where n is the number of
samples in a trace.

8.3

Optimized SAD Calculations Tests

Once the module was completed, we were able to perform a performance test and a
reliability test on the optimized algorithm. The test trace set is a trace set consisting
of 13000 traces, and each trace consist of 640000 samples. All the traces in the trace
set has been aligned before any testing was done. The main feature of this trace set
is that all of the traces contain seven peaks, and this trace set simulates a trace set
taken from a real embedded system. Figure 5 shows this test trace set.

Figure 5: icWaves Test Trace Set

The ﬁrst test we performed was the performance test. This test is designed to see
if the optimized algorithm is faster than the brute force method. For this test, we
selected samples 2027 starting at sample 107674. For comparison, a module with the
brute force method with oﬀset of 1 was able to complete all the calculations in 4 days
on a machine with a 3.0GHz processor. On the other hands, the optimized module
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takes about 20 hours to complete all the calculations with an oﬀset of 1. Furthermore,
if the oﬀset is set to 64, the optimized module takes 30 minutes to complete all the
calculations, and it takes 10 minutes to complete execution with oﬀset set to 128. At
oﬀset 256, the module takes 5 minutes to complete execution. Note that a higher
oﬀset means less accurate result will be produced. Overall, the optimized module is
provably faster in execution time than the brute force method.

The next test we performed was the reliability, and this test is designed to test the
accuracy of the module. The oﬀset is set to 1, and only 100 traces will be used in
the following tests. For the ﬁrst test (test 1), we selected 2000 samples centered at
the raising edge of the second peak. Test 1 is shown in ﬁgure 6. Test 1 is designed
to test the module in a high false positive environment. A false positive is when the
pattern triggers outside of the selected area given a threshold, and a false negative is
when the pattern failed to trigger in the selected area given a threshold. The result
of test 1 is as follows: a pattern is selected at the beginning of the raising edge, and
50 false positives and 5 false negatives were reported. As explained, the high false
positive was to be expected due to the design of this test.

Figure 6: icWaves Test 1

Test 2 of the reliability test designed for low false positives, and it is designed to
test the false negatives. For this test, we selected 2000 samples centered at the raising
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edge of the ﬁrst peak. Test 2 is shown in ﬁgure 7. The result of test 2 is as follows: a
pattern is selected slightly after the beginning of the raising edge, and 5 false positives
and 0 false negatives were reported. In other words, the module was able to ﬁnd a
pattern where icWaves will trigger early 5 percent of the time.

Figure 7: icWaves Test 2

The smart triggering is based on the observation that a lot of SAD calculations are
being repeated. We developed an Inspector module that uses this fact to optimize
the SAD calculations to ﬁnd the best pattern for icWaves triggering. The result of
executing the module shown that the optimization does indeed show improvement
over the brute force method time wise. The optimized module is extremely accurate
in ﬁnding the pattern with the least amount of false positives and false negatives.
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CHAPTER 9
DEMA on ATXmega256A3B

In this chapter, we will describe in detail how we perform DEMA on the Xmega’s
AES cryptographic accelerator, and the results will be presented and compared to
DPA in a later section. In our experiments, we would like to perform DEMA under
diﬀerent conﬁgurations, and we wanted to know the results of performing DEMA
under these diﬀerent conﬁgurations. The diﬀerent conﬁgurations are the types of
EM probe, the location of acquisitions, putting a hardware ﬁlter in our set up, and
performing DEMA with resampled traces.

9.1

Locating X-Y on Xmega

For the Xmega, we have full control over the embedded system, so we program the
Xmega to continuously perform AES cryptographic operation at 32MHz while taking
measurements at diﬀerent sections on the Xmega. The Xmega is divided into a 10 by
10 grid, and measurements are taken for each of these 10 by 10 blocks. The resulting
traces are ran through a module for Inspector called Spectral Intensity. This module
shows the amount of the average amplitude of the signal after applying a band pass
ﬁlter as a grid. Blue means there are minimum activities at such frequencies at that
location, and red means relatively maximum activities at such frequencies at that
location. Figure 8 is the resulting grid of running the spectral intensity module on
the trace set.

As we can see, there are two hot spots on the chips around the 32MHz frequency
band. That means there a lot of activities on these parts of the chips around the
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Figure 8: Spectral Intensity of Xmega during AES operations around 32MHz with
+/- 0.2MHz bandwidth
32MHz frequencies band. Since the chip is programmed to only perform AES operations over and over again, we will assume that one of these hot spots is where
the AES cryptographic engine is located. However, it is possible that this location
can be where the clock generator is located or other components, and there is no
telling what exactly is at that location without the actual circuit schematic of the
Xmega. Furthermore, if we refer back to ﬁgure 3, we can see that the I/O operations
are located on the edge of the chip, so we will assume that the AES cryptographic
operations must be performed on the other hot spot. The I/O operations exist due to
number 1 and numebr 4a/b from ﬁgure 4; the commands being sent from Inspector
to the Xmega, and the responds from Xmega to Inspector are the caused of the I/O
activities. From now on, we will refer the center hot spot as location 1 and the hot
spot on the edge as location 2. Note that the Xmega is ﬂipped 180 degree during the
X-Y measurements, so the orientation of the spectral intensity versus the block dia-
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gram is ﬂipped. Thus, we have located the X-Y coordinate of the AES cryptographic
operation on the Xmega, and we can begin taking a large amount of traces provided
we have a good trigger.

9.2

Setting up the trigger for DEMA

Since we have full control over the embedded system, we could program the embedded system with a very accurate trigger. In this project, the Xmega is programmed
to receive 16 bytes of randomly chosen plain text and recorded by Inspector, and the
Xmega will send 16-bytes of cipher text back to Inspector. The key for encryption is
programmed onto the embedded system. For this project, the secret key is chosen to
be: 0x52 0x49 0x53 0x43 0x55 0x52 0x45 0x49 0x53 0x43 0x4F 0x4F 0x4C 0x21 0x31
0x00. In addition, port C1 (as shown in ﬁgure 3) will send out a 5 volts signal just
before the AES encryption operation begins, and the signal will disappear as soon as
the operation is completed. This port is connected to channel B of the LeCroy 610zi
in order to trigger on the raising edge and begin taking traces.

9.3
9.3.1

DEMA at Location 1
DEMA with Low Sensitivity Probe at Location 1

Now that we have a good trigger, we can begin taking a large amount of traces. In
order to minimize the number of samples in a trace while leave as much leakage as
possible, we will begin taking traces as soon as the trigger is detected with no delays
and end taking traces as soon as port C1 no longer has a 5 volts signal. As such, we
will take traces at sampled at 1GHz with 26000-27000 samples in order to maximize
the information we get from the traces within only the AES operations. There are
two types of EM probes come with Inspector, and they are low sensitivity and high
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sensitivity probes. As the name suggested, the high sensitivity probe can capture
weaker signal. The trade oﬀ of using the high sensitivity is that it can also capture
more noises as well. We will begin with using the low sensivity probe. Figure 9 is
one of the million traces taken with the parameters described above.

Figure 9: An EM trace taken at 1GHz with 27000 samples; LS probe

We can begin analysing the traces now that we have taken 1 million traces. Referring back to ﬁgure 9, we can take a note of a couple important details about the
Xmega and its AES accelerator. First, the Xmega generates a 2 volts EM ﬁeld of
signal from where we positioned the EM probe. This 2 volts generation is aﬀected by
the position of the EM probe; the further away the probe is, then the voltage emission
is also lowered. Second, the entire AES operation can be performed in 260 microseconds. As for performing DEMA/DPA, the plain text and cipher text are store as the
ﬁrst 16 bytes and last 16 bytes in the ”Data” section of the trace respectively.

While we know that the Xmega is clocked at 32MHz, it is good verify this claim.
We shall do so by running the Spectrum module of Inspector on the trace set. The
Spectrum module will show all the frequencies that are most active given the trace set.
Figure 10 is the result of running the Spectrum module on the trace set. The module
is a fast Fourier transform based spectrum analyzer. Thus, we only see frequencies
up to 500MHz in ﬁgure 10 instead of the sample rate of 1GHz due to the Nyquist
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limit.

Figure 10: Spectrum of the EM trace set

As we can see, the frequency 32.74MHz stands out the most, and this tells us that
the Xmega is not operating at exactly 32MHz. In addition, two upper harmonics
frequencies also stands out the most: 65.46MHz and 130.98MHz. The next step in
analyzing the trace set is to resample the traces at these three frequencies in order
to get reduce the noises presented in the traces. The resampling is done via fast
Fourier transform. Since we oversampled the traces to 1GHz, extra information are
introduced to the trace set, and these extra informations will aﬀect the success of
DEMA. The results are shown in ﬁgure 11. In this ﬁgure, the example traces as
the result of resampling to 32.74MHz, 65.46MHz, and 130.98MHz are shown. If we
examine the trace resampled at 32.74MHz, we can see diﬀerent regions. The ﬁrst
region is from 1.5 ms to 6.5 ms; the second region is from 6.5 ms to 11.5 ms; the third
region is from 11.5 ms to 23.5 ms; and the last region is from 23.5 ms to 27 ms. For
the next step, we would like to identify the exact timing of when the AES encryption
occurs.

Now that we have reduced some of the noises presented in the trace set, we would
like to identify the exact timing of the AES cryptographic operations. While we
programmed the traces to be taken as soon as the AES operations begin, there are
still operations within the AES operations that we want to exclude during DEMA such
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Figure 11: EM traces resampled
as input and output processing. By capturing signal with only the AES encryption
operation, we can reduce the number of samples per trace, and this will reduce the
time it takes to perform DEMA on the trace set. We can identify the actual AES
encryption operation by identifying the AES input and output operations. We can do
so by running the Correlation module. The correlation module will run a correlation
on the speciﬁc bytes of the data section of each traces. Refer to section 4.5 for more
detail about data correlation. A high correlation on a byte will correspond to the
time when the byte is being input/output during the AES operations.

Figure 12 and 13 show the input and output data correlation on the trace set
resampled at 32.74MHz respectively. Thus, it is logical to conclude that the AES
encryption operations must reside in between these two sections of the trace. Figure
14 shows where the AES encryption is located within a trace.
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Figure 12: Correlation on the input data

Figure 13: Correlation on the output data

Figure 14: Location of AES encryption during the trace
The last step in this signal processing before we can perform DEMA is to align
the ﬁrst round of the AES encryption for all the traces in the trace set. This can be
easily done with the Static Alignment module of Inspector. The Static Alignment
module will allow user to select an area in the trace as well as allow user to specify
a max shift range and a threshold. The module will shift the same range as the user
selected area left and right up to the max shift range, and the module will calculate
the correlation value for each shift. If the correlation value is above the threshold,
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then the whole trace is shifted to that location. If the correlation value of each shift is
below the threshold, the trace is thrown out of the trace set. Alignment is important in
performing DEMA/DPA as the H matrix (Refer to section 4.1) is produced assuming
all the traces are aligned. Once we have done static alignment for all three resampled
trace set, we can begin perform DEMA on these trace sets. The FirstOrderAnalyst
module of Inspector is ran on all these trace sets with Hamming Weight targeting
the 1st round of SubByte (SBox), Hamming Distance targeting the 1st round of
SubByte, and Hamming Distance targeting the 10th round of AddRoundKey as their
power model. By running the diﬀerent power model and target combinations, we can
see leakage model of the Xmega and allow us to perform DEMA based on this leakge
model. Table 1 shows the resulting keys recovering from the diﬀerent trace sets,
power model, and target combinations. Note that HW denotes Hamming Weight,
HD denotes Hamming Distance, and ”Round 10th round” denotes the AddRoundKey
function of the 10th round.

Power Model/Target

HW/SBox 1st round
HW/SBox 1st round
HW/SBox 1st round
HD/SBox 1st round
HD/SBox 1st round
HD/SBox 1st round
HD/Round 10th round
HD/Round 10th round
HD/Round 10th round
Table 1: DEMA with

Frequency

Key Recovered

Correct
Key
Bytes
32.74MHz 5d465397005200495c4300004cd5314f 6
65.46MHz 5d49534355524549534300004c2131f4 12
130.98MHz a200534355a0b54958434f000f21c1f4 7
32.74MHz
3e83e0c0e6d16c253fc06c836c4da293 0
65.46MHz
00ca3fc06c836c253fc06c836c926c4c 0
130.98MHz
Not ran
–
32.74MHz 00459c7518da4201d36300ef4917ba23 0
65.46MHz
e4ca1f431c871c7ﬀefd991a7d2e2abd 1
130.98MHz 8300d3e527f9ba41bbcb33420b662840 0
Diﬀerent power models and targets with 1 million traces
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9.3.2

DEMA with High Sensitivity Probe at Location 1

As we can see, the best approach for DEMA on Xmega is using Hamming Weight
as power model and target the ﬁrst round of SBox. We nearly recover all of the
key bytes. In order to capture as much leakage as possible within our traces, we
began taking more traces with the high sensitivity (HS) probe. Table 2 shows the
results of analyzing these new trace sets. We were able to capture 1.5M traces within
24 hours, and another 1.6M traces the next 24 hours. In between the captures, we
perform DEMA on the 1.5M trace set. While the trace set resampled to 32.71MHz
and 131.1MHz show improvement over their LS trace set, the trace set resampled to
65.43MHz shows no improvement even with HS probe and move traces in the trace
set. In addition, doubling the amount of traces to 3.1M traces did not improve the
result as we can see in table 2.
Power Model/Target Frequency Traces

HW/SBox
HW/SBox
HW/SBox
HW/SBox
HW/SBox
HW/SBox

9.3.3

1st
1st
1st
1st
1st
1st

round
round
round
round
round
round

32.71MHz 1.5M
65.43MHz 1.5M
131.1MHz 1.5M
32.71MHz 3.1M
65.43MHz 3.1M
131.1MHz 3.1M
Table 2: DEMA; Hi

Key Recovered

Correct
Key
Bytes
004900435552000053434f004c003100 10
004900435552454900434f4f00213100 12
004900435552000053434f0000218d0d 8
004900435552000053434f004c003100 10
00490043555245495343004f002131f4 11
004900005552450053434f4f002149f4 9
Sensitivity Probe

DEMA with High Sensitivity Probe and Hardware Filter at Location 1

Since switching to HS probe shown no improvement over the LS probe, we apply
a hardware ﬁlter of 48MHz. In ﬁgure 4, the ﬁlter is placed between the probe and
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the LeCroy at number 3. The hardware ﬁlter will eliminate all the high frequency
noises during acquisition. Figure 15 shows an example trace with ﬁlter on as well as
the spectrum of the trace set. A million traces were taken in this trace set.

Figure 15: Sample trace and spectrum of ﬁltered trace set

In this new trace set, we can see two dominating frequencies: 32.78MHz and
65.49MHz. We resampled the trace set to these two frequencies and the resulting
traces are shown in ﬁgure 16. We began running the DEMA module on diﬀerent
power models and targets once again, and the results are presented in table 3. As we
can see, the best approach would be attacking the ﬁrst round of SBox using Hamming
Weight as power model on 32.78MHz.

Table 4 shows the correlation between the number of traces and key bytes recovered
on trace set resampled at 32.78MHz with Hamming Weight as power model and
targeting the ﬁrst round of SBox. Figure 17 shows the graph representation of table
4. As we can see, we recovered about the same number of key bytes with HS probe
low pass ﬁltered at 48 MHz as to oppose of using the low sensitivity (LS) probe, but
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Figure 16: Filter trace set resampled
Power Model/Target

Frequency

Key Recovered

HW/SBox 1st round
32.78MHz 0049533d555245495343ad4f4c21000b
HW/SBox 1st round
65.49MHz 00b0e5f00016db91675b6cb4f63dd00f
HD/SBox 1st round
32.78MHz 001dc9170d286a10e02f635c7b85974c
HD/SBox 1st round
65.49MHz 00b1cb57f17ee289e09b861f77dca993
HD/SBox 10th round
32.78MHz 001dc9170d286a10e02f635c7b85974c
HD/Round 10th round 32.78MHz 001dc9170d286a10e02f635c7b85974c
HD/Round 1st round
65.49MHz 00b1cb57f17ee289e09b861f77dca993
Table 3: 48 MHz low pass Filtered DEMA with Diﬀerent power models and
with 100k traces

Correct
Key
Bytes
11
0
0
0
0
0
0
targets

we were able to achieve such results with only 240k traces as to opposed to 1 million
traces. Thus this was a huge improvement over using the LS probe since the number
of traces required to achieve similar results with 4 times less traces.

44

Power Model/Target
HW/SBox 1st round
HW/SBox 1st round
HW/SBox 1st round
HW/SBox 1st round
HW/SBox 1st round
HW/SBox 1st round
HW/SBox 1st round
HW/SBox 1st round
HW/SBox 1st round
HW/SBox 1st round
Table 4: DEMA on

Traces
Key Recovered
Correct Key Bytes
25000 009e08d8a3a24d3336e1104f3d2119b8
1
50000 004953d88b3c6d7288e1104fe021bd0b
2
75000 00495353553c458e0043104f94214f4b
7
100000 00495373551945495343104f912100b6
9
125000 0049530055a245495343144f912100b6
9
150000 00495300552745495343104f9121000b
9
175000 00495300555245495343144f0021004b
10
200000 00495300555b454953431b4f9121004b
9
225000 004953525552454953431b4fb621000b
10
240000 004953a2555b454953431b4fb621000b
9
32.78MHz; Hi Sensitivity Probe; 48 MHz Low Pass ﬁltered

Figure 17: Traces vs Correct Key Byte; DEMA on 32.78MHz; Hi Sensitivity Probe;
48 MHz Low Pass ﬁltered
9.4
9.4.1

DEMA at Location 2
DEMA with High Sensitivity Probe at Location 2

Since taking a large amount of traces shown no improvement, we beginning looking
for alternative leakage. Recall that ﬁgure 8 displays two diﬀerent hot spots on the
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chip. We initially assumed that the other hot spot (this location will now be referred
as location 2 from now on) was simply I/O activities. We revised our assumption
and begin taking traces at location 2. The data correlation of these traces shown
that there are possible leakage similar to the previous traces. Thus, we took traces at
this location with HS probe and no ﬁltering. Figure 18 shows the diﬀerence between
traces from location 1 and location 2 resampled at 65.43 MHz. Table 5 shows the key
bytes recovered at 32.71 MHz, 65.43 MHz, and 130.86 MHz with various trace set
sizes, and ﬁgure 19 displays this data in graphical form with more data. The number
of traces shown in the table and chart are after alignment, and all the unaligned
traces has been thrown out. Nearly full key recovery was achieved with just 225k
traces for 32.71 MHz resampling, and similar result was achieved with 125k traces for
65.43 MHz resampling. However, full key recovery was not achieved despise taking
as much as 4 million traces. Note that the time to run the analysis for 32.71 MHz
and 65.43 MHz are similar; and this is due to 32.71 MHz resampling takes twice as
many traces as 65.43 MHz resampling, but there are roughly twice as many data in
65.43 MHz resampling to be processed.

Figure 18: Traces of AES operations resampled at 65.43 MHz; Location 1 on top;
Location 2 on bottom
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Frequency
32.71MHz
32.71MHz
32.71MHz
32.71MHz
32.71MHz
32.71MHz
32.71MHz
65.43MHz
65.43MHz
65.43MHz
65.43MHz
65.43MHz
65.43MHz
65.43MHz
130.86MHz
130.86MHz
130.86MHz
130.86MHz
130.86MHz
Table 5:

9.5

Traces
25k
100k
500k
1M
2M
3M
4M
25k
100k
500k
1M
2M
3M
4M
25k
50k
75k
100k
150k
DEMA

Key Recovered
Correct Key Bytes
aba673b384d566d067b50214b1f50fcf
0
004953439e52c449a4434fd44c21310a
10
004953435552454953434F4F4C213100
15
004953435552454953434F4F4C213100
15
004953435552454953434F4F4C213100
15
004953435552454953434F4F4C213100
15
004953435552454953434F4F4C2131f4
14
35498c29cb9366a7b3b59a2a3368ddcf
1
004940009e52454953434f4f4c21310a
11
004953435552454953434F4F4C213100
15
004953435552454953434F4F4C213100
15
004953435552454953434F4F4C213100
15
004953435552454953434F4F4C213100
15
004953435552454953434F4F4C2131b4
14
cbﬀ59f7abf8c4ﬀ3db5abec1a8a19cf
0
00f8e0447c4312493d5069af6222b60a
1
00005d5e085264923d741dc6d55b0d97
1
000053329e5291494b434f004c520d56
6
00005343a0520249e8434f4f4c21f01b
9
at location 2; Hi Sensitivity Probe; HW/SBox 1st round

Summary of DEMA on Xmega

Three diﬀerent options in conﬁgurations were introduced in our experiments: LS
and HS probes, 48MHz hardware ﬁlter, locations 1 and location 2 of the Xmega,
and trace set resampling. In all of our experiments, we used Hamming Weight as
our power model and targeted the ﬁrst round of the SubByte operation, and all the
other power model and target combinations shown no results (Zero bytes of the key
recovered). In sections 9.3.1 and 9.4.1, we obtained trace sets from two diﬀerent
locations based on the spectrum shown in ﬁgure 8. The best result we obtained from
location 1 is recovering 12 bytes of the key. On the other hands, we were able to
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Figure 19: Traces vs Correct Key Byte; DEMA on Location 2; Hi Sensitivity Probe
recover 15 bytes of the key with location 2. Based on these results, we can conclude
that there are more than one location where the leakage can occur on the Xmega,
and the most leakage occurs the most at location 2 where we believed where the
input/output operations of the Xmega is located. In section 9.3.3, we attempted to
perform DEMA by introducing a 48MHz hardware ﬁlter into our set up to eliminate
high frequencies noises. With the hardware ﬁlter, we were able to recover 11 bytes
of the key with only 100k traces, while 12 bytes of the key were recovered with
the unﬁltered set up as shown in section 9.3.1. Both of the unﬁltered and ﬁltered
experiment were done at location 1. This indicated that the hardware ﬁlter does
eliminate the high frequencies noise picked up by the EM probe. In addition, we also
tested the uses of LS probe and the uses of HS probe. In section 9.3.2, we performed
DEMA with the HS probe, and we were able to recover 12 bytes of the key with 1.5M
traces. However, we cannot draw conclusion on which probe shown better results
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since the experiment done in section 9.3.1 was with 1M traces. Further research will
need to be done in order draw conclusion regarding the use of LS probe and the use
of HS probe. Finally, we resampled all of our trace sets to 32.71MHz (clock frequency
of the Xmega) and 65.43MHz (upper harmonic) in all of our experiments. In section
9.4.1, the trace set resampled to 32.71MHz was able to recover 15 bytes of the with
225k traces; the trace set resampled at 65.43MHz was able to recover the same key
with 125k traces. While the trace set resampled 65.43MHz takes less traces, it also
takes twice as much data as the trace set resampled at 32.71MHz. Thus, the amount
of resource (data storage and processing time) is doubled for the same key recovery
for the trace set resampled at 65.43MHz

In summary, we were not able to achieve full key recovery with DEMA, but we
were able to recover up to 15 bytes of the key. The location of the probe is one of
the most important factor in determining if we can achieve full key recovery. For the
experiments with the EM probe, we placed the EM probe in two diﬀerent locations.
The ﬁrst location that we placed the EM probe is located at the center of the chip,
and we believed location 1 is where the cryptographic engine is located on the chip.
However, we were only able to recover up to 12 bytes of the key with 1.5 million
traces resampled to 65.43MHz with our best attempt of DEMA at this location, and
increasing the number of traces did not improve the number of bytes of the key
recovered. The next location that we placed the probe is near the edge of the chip,
and we believed location 2 to be the input/output lines between the chip and the
serial interface. We were able to recover up to 15 bytes of the key with traces taken
from this location, and 225k traces resampled to 32.71MHz or 125k traces resampled
to 65.43MHz were needed to achieve the 15 bytes recovery. The calculation times
between the two resampled trace sets are roughly the same due to the number of
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samples per trace and the number of trace in the trace set. The best conﬁguration
we found from our experiment is to used the HS probe, unﬁltered, at location 2,
and perform DEMA on the trace set resampled at either 32.71MHz or 65.43MHz
depending on the computational resource one might have. In the next section, we
will begin performing DPA on the Xmega and discuss the results.
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CHAPTER 10
DPA on ATXmega256A3B

As mentioned in the previous sections, DPA is a side channel attack technique
that uses the power measurements of the system of interests while it is performing
cryptographic operations. For this project, we will be taking measurements in two
ways, and the two ways are across the resistor on the ground end and the current
on the VCC end of the chip. We will ﬁrst present the result of analyzing the traces
from measuring across the resistor, and we will also present the result of analyzing
the traces from measuring the current.

10.1

DPA: Measuring across the resistor

The set up for measuring across the resistor is very similar to that of measuring the
EM leakage for Xmega. Once again, we will have a work station running Inspector,
the LeCroy oscilloscope, and the Xmega. The Xmega is connected to the work station
for transferring plain text and cipher text between the two by the means of USB/serial
converter. The trigger is done exactly the way as described in the DEMA section.
Figure 20 is a diagram of the set up described above. The major diﬀerences are how
the chip is powered and how the oscilloscope is taking measurements. The chip is no
longer being powered by the work station, but it is powered by 3V DC power source.
For taking measurements, we put a resistor between the ground of the power source
and the Xmega. The strength of the resistor will aﬀect the quality of the traces; a
resistor with higher resistance will increase the quality of the traces. The probe will
be measuring the drop in voltage across the resistor as the Xmega is performing the
cryptographic operations. According to Ohm’s law, V = I × R, where V is voltage,
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I is current, and R is resistance. Since the resistance is constant in this set up, this
means the change in voltage is linearly related to the current. In addition, we noticed
that the ground end of the trigger probe is drawing more current than the ground end
of the power source. This causes an incomplete circuit for the Xmega and rendered
it inoperable, so we put a 10M ohm resistor on the ground end of the trigger probe
in order to make the Xmega operatable again.

Figure 20: Set up diagram for DPA with resistor

During the acquisition of the traces, we also noticed that the power signal is very
weak compared to the EM signal. The EM signal ranges from 2V to 3V, and the
power signal ranges from 50mV to 100mV. As such, we increased the strength of the
power signal by adding a 12V ampliﬁer between the probe and oscilloscope. Figure
21 shows traces with and without the ampliﬁer. Furthermore, we observed that
there are periodic power spike in our traces as demonstrated in the bottom trace
of ﬁgure 21. This power spike occurred due to the changes in voltage of the other
active components of the chip such as LEDs and USB controller. With this additional
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power spike, we need to acquire more traces and throw out the ones with power spikes
occurring in the region that we are interested during our trace alignment phase.

Figure 21: Power Traces of overall operations sampled at 1 GHz; With ampliﬁer on
top; Without ampliﬁer on bottom

Since using more than 4 million traces with no notable result means that this set
up will not as eﬃcient as the set up for DEMA, we have not take more than 4 million
traces with this set up. Due to time constrain, we only capture 1.5M aligned traces
by measuring with the 1k ohm resistor and capture 2.5M aligned traces by measuring
with the 1M ohm resistor. Figure 22 shows sample traces using the set up with the
resistor, and the two traces show power signal sampled at 1 GHz and resampled at
32.96 MHz.

During the analysis phase, we resampled the traces down to 32.96MHz and
65.67MHz as suggested by running the Spectrum module on the trace set. However, the trace sets resampled down to these two frequencies yield no notable results
up to 2.5 million traces. That means zero byte of the key was recovered from the
resampled trace set. On the other hands, we were able to get signiﬁcant results by
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analyzing the raw traces sampled at 1 GHz. Table 6 shows the results by analyzing
the traces. Noted that we were able to achieve a full key recovery with 2.5 million
traces by measuring across an 1M ohm resistor sampled at 1 GHz. The time it takes
to acquire 2.5 million traces is roughly two days, and the time for analysis is about
1 days. Thus it will take about a total of 3 days in order to achieve full key recovery. Figure 23 shows the number of traces compared against the number of key
bytes recovered. Based on the ﬁgure, we can see that the 1M ohm resistor shown
better results than the 1k ohm resistor, and the 1M ohm resistor was able to recover
twice as many bytes of the key as the 1k ohm resistor between 400k and 1M traces.
However, the 1k ohm resistor recovered 14 bytes of the key with 1M traces, which is
one byte short of the trace set with 1M ohm resistor with the same number of traces.
Below 1M traces, the 1M ohm resistor was able to show better results, but we cannot
draw conclusion on which resistor shows better results. We can further research this
question by taking more traces with the 1k resistor until we achieve full key recovery.

Figure 22: Power Traces of AES operation over 1M ohm resistor; Sampled at 1 GHz
on top; Resampled to 32.96 MHz on bottom
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Resistor Traces
Key Recovered
Correct Key Bytes
1k ohm
25k
070eaa3011604f9556c9fbd4a48a3664
0
1k ohm
250k 33728a43554d5ad60d3d1d14676dba9b
2
1k ohm
500k
5272fd4e71771ef0539f2043660b4df2
2
1k ohm
1M
5249e443556bb04953430eb78a0b0b00
8
1k ohm
1.5M 5249534355c3454953434F434C213100
14
1M ohm
25k
d4e6257cafc99014d0a600942f87646f
0
1M ohm 250k
302a851659a774e336b58b6717cd7595
0
1M ohm 500k
5249704a55e2ae4932434f624ce55000
8
1M ohm
1M
524926435552454953434fb04c213200
13
1M ohm 1.5M
524953435552424953434f924c213100
15
1M ohm
2M
524953435552454953434fb04c213100
15
1M ohm 2.5M
524953435552454953434f4f4c213100
16
Table 6: DPA with resistors; HW/SBox 1st round; Sampled at 1 GHz

Figure 23: Traces vs Correct Key Byte; DPA with Resistor
10.2

DPA: Measuring the current

In this section, we will describe our set up for measuring the current of the Xmega
while it is performing cryptographic operation, then we will discuss the results of
analyzing the traces obtained with this set up. Note that this set up is the same as
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the previous side channel analysis eﬀort [30]. As expected, the result of this set up
closely resemble that of the previous work.

The overall set up for measuring current is quite similar to that of the set up for
measuring across the resistor. The major diﬀerences are once again the power source
and the probe that we are using. Instead of using a 3V DC power supply, we used
two AA batteries in series to provide a stable 3V power supply for the Xmega. The
current probe is attached onto the VCC end of the batteries instead of the ground
end. This was suggested by a colleague, and we would to repeat the experiments done
in sections 9.3.1, 9.4.1, and 10 with the battery as power source in the near future
as further research. Finally, we power the chip via the programming pin rather than
from the power inlet provided on the chip. The only diﬀerence between our set up
and the set up from the previous work [30] is that we did not remove the onboard
LED(s). The diagram for this set up is shown on ﬁgure 24.

Figure 24: Set up diagram for DPA with current
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Similar to measuring across the resistor, the signals for measuring the current are
also very weak. The signals are in the -/+ 10 mV range. In addition, the periodic
power spikes are once again present in the traces, and the process of throwing out
unusable traces is once again employed with the use of the Static Alignment module
(details in section 9.3.1). Figure 25 shows resulting traces with this set up. The top
trace shows trace with the periodic power spike, and the bottom trace is power spike
free. If we examine the traces, we can once again identify the diﬀerent stages of the
AES operation in the traces. The 10 ms to 21 ms range is where the AES encryptions
occur, and we veriﬁed this ﬁndings by once again running the data correlation module.
The major diﬀerence from the traces of this set up and from the traces of the previous
set up is that a very low frequency signal, at 1MHz, is presented in the traces. We
applied a software, as part of Inspector, band pass ﬁlter ranged from 1.5 MHz to
5 GHz in order to get rid of this low frequency signal while preserving the original
signals. Figure 26 shows traces of the ﬁrst half of the AES encryption operations. A
band pass ﬁltered is applied to these traces to remove the low frequency signal. The
bottom trace is the original trace sampled at 1 GHz, and the top and middle traces
are resampled to 32.71MHz and 65.43MHz from the original trace.

In the previous side channel attack eﬀort of the Xmega, only 30k traces were
needed in order to achieve full key recovery [30]. In our attempts, we were able to
produce similar results. We achieve full key recovery with 45k traces resampled to
32.71 MHz. In addition, 100k traces resampled to 65.43 MHz were needed to achieve
full key recovery. Note that for traces resampled at 65.43 MHz, 15 bytes of the key
were recovered from analysis attempts between 60k traces and 100k traces, and the
diﬀerence of correlation values for the missing byte between the real key and the key
guess was no more than 0.0002. That means there is a high probability that we should
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be able to achieve full key recovery with about 60k traces resampled at 65.43 MHz.
We will discuss the success rate against number of traces in a later section. Finally,
the analysis on the original traces was able to recover up to 15 bytes of the key with
40k traces. However, the execution time, clocked at 24 hours, of analysis of the 1
GHz traces is much higher than the analysis of the 32.71 MHz and 65.43 MHz traces.
Table 7 and ﬁgure 27 show the full results discussed in this paragraph. Overall, we
reproduce similar results to that of the previous side channel attack on the Xmega
with only 20k more trace [30]. While we need 2.5M traces for the trace set measuring
across the resistor to perform full key recovery, we only need 50k traces in order to
perform full key recovery by measuring with the current probe. This result shows us
that the leakage from change in current is stronger than that of measuring the change
in voltage.

Figure 25: Power traces with current; With random spike on top; Without random
spike on bottom

10.3

DPA: Success rate

In this section, we will determine the side channel attack’s success rate by measuring
across the resistor. There is a module in Inspector, called First Order Stats, that will
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Figure 26: Power traces with current on 32.71 MHz, 65.43 MHz, and 1 GHz
Frequency Traces
Key Recovered
Correct Key Bytes
32.71MHz
25k
5214d9bf6e52454953434f4f2d21318f
10
32.71MHz
30k
524953b4555245491e434f4f3c213100
13
32.71MHz
40k
5256534355524549534c4f4f4c213100
14
32.71MHz
45k
524953435552454953434f4f4c213100
16
32.71MHz
50k
524953435552454953434f4f4c213100
16
65.43MHz
25k
52cdd9535552d04953434f4f9e210800
10
65.43MHz
30k
527453535552568b53434f4f4c213100
12
65.43MHz
50k
52eb53435552564953434f4f4c213100
14
60k
524953435552564953434f4f4c213100
15
65.43MHz
65.43MHz
75k
524953435552564953434f4f4c213100
15
65.43MHz 100k 524953435552454953434f4f4c213100
16
1GHz
25k
52c453935552dc4953434f4f4c213100
13
1GHz
30k
52e553975552dc4953434f4f4c213100
13
1GHz
40k
527b53435552454953434f4f4c213100
15
1GHz
50k
527b534355520e4953434f4f4c213100
14
1GHz
60k
527b53435552d44953434f4f4c213100
14
Table 7: DPA with current probe; HW/SBox 1st round

perform the success rate calculation provided that we have a large amount of traces.
The First Order Stats module will split the trace set into k smaller and equal in size
sub trace sets. For each of these k sub trace sets, the module will perform DPA on
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Figure 27: Traces vs Correct Key Byte; DPA with Current
a small number, i, of traces and increase i by some constant until the all traces in
the sub trace sets have been used. The module will then report the number of traces
needed to achieve full key recovery in each k sub trace sets for each i number of traces.
We can then determine the side channel attack’s success rate based on these results.

For our experiments, we will be measuring the success rate of performing DPA
with current. We were able to obtain 5.2 million traces for this experiment. We will
only perform the experiment on trace sets resampled to 32.71 MHz and 65.43 MHz
since these are the frequencies that we were able to achieve full key recovery. Based
on the results from the previous section, we know that the highest number of traces
that we need to achieve full key recovery is 100k traces, so we will use this number as
our limit. Hence, we have 52 sub trace sets with 100k traces each. For each of these
sub trace sets, we will perform DPA at every 1000 traces (e.g. DPA on 1k traces,
2k traces, ... 100k traces). Table 28 shows the results of this experiment. Note that
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both frequencies produced similar graphs. Based on these results, we can see that the
minimum amount of traces needed to achieve full key recovery with some probability
of success is 30k traces, and this is consistence with the previous side channel attack
eﬀort [30]. On the other hands, both frequencies show that performing DPA with
80k traces will guarantee a full key recovery. However, performing DPA on traces
sampled at a lower frequency will yield faster execution time. Thus, performing DPA
on trace sets resampled to 32.71 MHz execute twice as fast as trace sets resampled
at 65.43 MHz. Hence, resampling traces to the operating frequency of the Xmega is
suggested for DPA in terms of overall performance.

Figure 28: Success rate vs Number of traces at 32.71 MHz and 65.43 MHz

10.4

Summary of DPA on Xmega

In summary, we achieve full key recovery in multiple occasions. We performed DPA
in two diﬀerent ways. The ﬁrst way is to measure the change in voltage by placing
a resistor on the ground wire of the target, and the second way is placing a current
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probe on the VCC wire of the target. Full key recovery was achieved using both
ways. By measuring the voltage across the resistor, we achieve full key recovery with
2.5 million unﬁltered traces. On the other hands, we achieve full key recovery using
only 45k resampled traces with the current probe. In addition, the First Order Stats
module shows us that only 80k traces are needed for guaranteed full key recovery.
In the case of measuring across the resistors, we cannot conclude if increasing the
resistance of the resistors will decrease the number of traces needed to perform full
key recovery. Further experiments is required to make such claim. However, since
we perform full key recovery from measuring both the change in voltage and change
in current, we can conclude that measuring the change in current yield better results
than measuring the change in voltage. The diﬀerence in the amount of traces needed
to perform full key recovery between the two methods is 2 millions, and the total time
(acquisitions and analysis) for performing DPA by measuring across the resistor is 3
days whereas the total time for performing DPA by measuring the current probe is
an hour. In the next section, we will discuss the experiments and results with using
a radio receiver as a downmixer and perform DPA and DEMA on the demodulated
signals.
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CHAPTER 11
Downshifting with Icom R7000

The Icom R7000 is a radio frequency radio receiver capable of capturing a wide
range of signals. In this section, we will be using the Icom R7000 (or simply referred
as Icom from now on) for downmixing. Downmixing is the process of applying a
bandpass ﬁlter on the received signals down to a base band. The Icom can receive
radio signal and downmix the signal to produce a single channel audio signal. The
Icom can receive signals from 25MHz to 999MHz and from 1025MHz to 2000MHz
in AM, AM-W, FM, FM-W, FM-N, USB, and LSB modes [29]. We chose the Icom
because it can receive a wide range of frequencies where as modern radio receivers
have restricted range of frequencies that they can receive. We like to expand the use
of the Icom outside of the scope of this project in the near future. In this section, we
will describe the set up for acquisitions with the Icom, and the results of performing
DPA and DEMA on the Xmega with the Icom as a demodulator.

11.1

Set up with the Icom

We will begin by discussing about the set up for DEMA on the Xmega with the
Icom. The set up with the Icom is exactly the same as the set up described in the
DEMA section. The Icom is equipped with an N-type connector on the back, and this
connector is used for attaching an antenna to the Icom for receiving radio signals. For
this experiment, we connected the high sensitivity EM probe to the N-type connector
port using a modiﬁed coax cable. There is an intermediate frequency (IF for short)
port used for other audio functions of the Icom. We connect the LeCroy to the
Icom using the IF port. The IF port will always produce a 10.7MHz out put signal
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regardless of the frequency of the radio receiver is tuned to listen on. Finally, we put
a 50 Ohms impedance matcher between the LeCroy and the Icom to prevent the Icom
from overloading the LeCroy with currents. Figure 29 shows a diagram of the set up.

Figure 29: Set up diagram for DEMA with the Icom R7000

As for DPA, we will only perform experiment with the Icom using only the current
probe since the current probe produced a much better result than measuring across
the resistor. Once again, the set up for DPA with the Icom is almost exactly the
same as the set up for DPA as described in the DPA section. The Icom is once again
connected to the current probe on the antenna port and connected to the LeCroy on
the IF port. Refer to number in ﬁgure 29 regarding where the Icom is located in the
set up.

As mentioned earlier, we can tune the Icom to listen to any frequencies that we
set as long as it is with in speciﬁcations, and the out put on the IF port will always
be 10.7MHz. If we tune the Icom to listen to the operating frequency of the target
and capture the out put signal on the IF port, we will be downshifting the operating
frequency down to 10.7MHz. The point of this experiment is to see if we can downshift
the operating frequency while successfully perform DPA or DEMA on the target. If
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we can manage to perform DPA/DEMA at 10.7MHz, then it means we can perform
DPA/DEMA more eﬃciently since performing DPA/DEMA at 10.7MHz takes less
calculations than traces taken at the operating frequency; this is due to the clock
frequency of the Xmega is 32MHz, and there are less samples per trace to perform
DPA/DEMA on per trace in the trace set (re)sampled at 10.7MHz than trace sets
(re)sampled at 32MHz. In our experiments, we will be downshifting the 32.71MHz
of the Xmega to 10.7MHz with the Icom.

Before we discuss the results of DPA and DEMA with the Icom, we will point out a
few observations about taking traces with the Icom. The ﬁrst observation is that the
out put signal of the IF is very weak, and it is in the -/+10mV range. We strengthened
the signal by putting a 12V ampliﬁer between the Icom and the LeCroy, and the signal
with the ampliﬁer is in the -/+50mV range. The second observation is that the Icom
can, and occasionally will, pick up other radio signal then the ones we intended since
the Icom is a radio receiver. The Icom can pick up signals from cell phone, EM
radiations from other electronic equipments nearby, or etc. Figure 30 shows a sample
trace with signals not coming from the current probe. This interference means more
traces are needed in order to perform DPA/DEMA on the target, and the traces
with this interference will have to be thrown out during the alignment phase of the
analysis. Finally, the spectrum of the traces (shown in ﬁgure 31) taken from the
IF port revealed three dominating frequencies. The three frequencies are 4.15MHz,
10.742MHz, and 17.334MHz. These frequencies are independent of the target, and
they are produced by the Icom by downmixing the received signal down to these
frequencies. This information will become useful when we begin analyzing the traces
from measuring the IF port of the Icom.
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Figure 30: Sample trace of interference with Icom

Figure 31: Spectrum of traces taken with the Icom
11.2

DPA with the Icom

In this section, we will be discussing the results of performing DPA on traces taken
with the Icom. Recall that we will only be taking traces with the current probes since
only 80k traces are needed in order to perform a full key recovery. Thus, if we can
perform full key recovery with less than 80k traces, then using the Icom will deﬁnitely
be an improvement. In this section, we like to see if downshifting with the Icom can
be an improvement over traditional method of performing DPA on our target.

Figure 32: Sample traces of all AES operations with current probe at 100MHz; unﬁltered on top; 17.334MHz resampling on bottom
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We will begin by examining the traces with the over all AES operations. Figure 32
is a sample trace of the over all AES operation with the current probe. The trace on
top is sampled at 100MHz and unﬁltered, and the trace on the bottom is resampled
to 17.334MHz as suggested by the Spectrum module. The Icom was set to receive at
32.71MHz during acquisition. The actual AES encryption operations are between 10
ms and 21 ms. We were able to perform the input and out put data correlations on
the resampled trace set. However, no correlations were found between the input/out
put data and the unﬁltered trace set. This suggests that there are a lot of noises
in the unﬁltered traces and we should resample the trace sets down to one of three
frequencies listed earlier.

We resampled the trace sets down to the three frequencies, 4.15MHz, 10.742MHz,
and 17.334MHz, as suggested by the Spectrum module. These frequencies are independent of the target, and they are produced by the Icom by downmixing the received
signal down to these frequencies. However, we were not able to recover any byte of
the key with 100k traces. The next step we took in this experiment is to ﬁgure out
the exact frequency in which is the leakage is happening. We reexamined the spectrum of our old trace sets taken with the current probe, and we found the following
frequencies are also leaking key information: 13.184MHz, 19.531MHz, 23.926MHz,
26.123MHz, 39.06MHz, and 45.65MHz. We found these frequencies by running the
Spectrum module of Inspector on traces taken in section 9.3.1 and locate the peak
frequencies. We were able to perform full key recovery with only 80k traces by resampling our old trace sets to these frequencies. Once again, we were not able to recover
any bytes of the key by taking traces from the IF port while tuning the Icom to these
frequencies.
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Figure 33: Sample traces with current probe and Icom; unﬁltered trace on top; 5MHz
to 25MHz band pass ﬁltered on bottom
Since we were not able to recover any byte of the key by simply resampling the
trace sets, band pass ﬁltering is our next option. Band pass ﬁltering allows us to
extract samples at a certain range of frequencies from a trace. In our experiments,
we applied a band pass ﬁlter from 5MHz to 25MHz to our trace set, and the purpose
of applying the band pass ﬁlter is to eliminate the higher frequencies noises while
preserving the 10.742MHz and 17.334MHz signals. Figure 33 shows a trace before
and after applying the band pass ﬁlter. In this ﬁgure, the trace on top exhibits
high frequencies noises in between each low frequency peaks, and the trace at the
bottom are free of all the high frequency noises and contains only signals between
the frequencies of 5MHz and 25MHz. Before we attempt to perform DPA on the
ﬁltered trace set, we ran a diagnostic tool called KnownKeyCorrelation. This tool
allows us to see the correlation value between the trace set and the known key. The
tool will take the known key and calculate the correlation value at each part of the
trace with diﬀerent power models (e.g. Hamming weight and Hamming Distance)
and targets (e.g. 1st round of SubByte and 10th round of AddRoundKey). The
user can compare the correlation values of all the diﬀerent power models and targets
combinations and determine which combination and the location in the trace are
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best suited for performing DPA/DEMA. Note that is tool can only be used when
the key is known by the attacker, and it is useful for attackers who have access
to a copy of the system of interest before attempting to attack the actual target.
For AES, the tool will test for Hamming Distance as well as Hamming Weight for
both Sbox in and Sbox out. Refer to section 4.1 about the diﬀerent power models,
targets, and correlation calculations. Figure 34 shows the results of running the
KnownKeyCorrelation module for 1.6 million traces. Each of the trace set shown in
the ﬁgure is overlapped with 16 traces, and each of these traces corresponds to a byte
of the key. The ﬁgure shows that there is a small correlation between the known
key and the Hamming Weight of the ﬁrst round of SBox out between 0.9ms and
1.3ms. Furthermore, the ﬁgure also shows a small correlation for the second round
between 2.0ms and 2.7ms and a small correlation for the third round between 2.7ms
and 4.0ms. The results show us a weak correlation between the known key and the
trace set. Nonetheless, there are still correlation between the key and the trace set,
so it is entirely possible to recover the key by performing DPA on the trace set.

Figure 34: Known key correlation on 1.6M PWC traces with Icom
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With the results of running the KnownKeyCorrelation module, we are conﬁdent
that performing DPA on the band pass ﬁltered trace set should be able to recover some
bytes of the key. With 1.6 million traces in the trace set, we recover up to 10 bytes
of the key, and we perform a full key recovery with an additional 1.2 million traces.
Thus, we perform full key recovery at 2.8 million traces. For further experiment, we
resampled the this 2.8 million traces trace set after applying the frequency ﬁlter to
4.15MHz, 10.742MHz, and 17.334MHz and perform DPA on each of these resampled
trace sets. None of these new trace sets were able to recover any bytes of the key.
Table 8 displays this said results. This suggests that the some of the information
leakage is hidden in the 10.742MHz frequency while some of the other information
leakage is hidden in the 17.334MHz frequency.

Frequency
Traces Correct Key Bytes
5MHz to 25MHz 1.6M
10
5MHz to 25MHz 2.8M
16
4.15MHz
2.8M
0
10.742MHz
2.8M
0
17.334MHz
2.8M
0
Table 8: DPA with current probe; HW/SBox 1st round; Downshifting with Icom

In summary, we perform full key recovery at 2.8 million traces with the set up
involving the Icom. However, recall that only 80k traces are needed to guarantee a
full key recovery without the Icom, so frequency downshifting with the Icom is not an
improvement over the traditional set up with the current probe. The signal that the
IF port of the Icom produced contains high frequency noises that need to be ﬁltered
out. In addition, the Icom also receives external noises from other sources such as cell
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phones and other nearby electronic equipments, and traces containing these noises
will have to be thrown out. The total execution time of performing DPA with the
Icom on 2.8M traces is 3 days with acquisitions and analysis whereas traditional
method required only an hour of execution time. Thus, using the Icom as a method
of performing DPA is not viable replacement, or an improvement, for DPA. In the
next section, we will explore how downshifting aﬀects DEMA.

11.3

DEMA with the Icom

In this section, we will be discussing the results of performing DEMA with the set
up with the Icom. We have already described the set up in section 11.2, and ﬁgure 29
shows a diagram of the set up. The only diﬀerence is replace the current probe with
the HS EM probe. Once again, an impedance matcher is placed between the Icom
and the LeCroy in order prevent the Icom from overloading the scope with current,
and we will show results of removing the impedance matcher in a later section.

Figure 35: Sample trace of EM during AES with Icom; unﬁltered trace on top; 5MHz
to 25MHz band pass ﬁltered on bottom

For the experiment with DEMA, we obtain 3.5 million traces. We once again attempt to perform DEMA by simply resampling the trace set to 4.15MHz, 10.742MHz,
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Figure 36: Known key correlation on 3.5M EM traces with Icom
and 17.334MHz. Again, none of these new trace sets were able produce any correct
key bytes, so we applied the band pass ﬁlter to the trace set once again. Since the
IF port of the Icom always produce signals in the same frequencies, we simply apply
the same band pass ﬁlter from 5MHz to 25MHz to the trace set. Figure 35 shows
sample trace before and after applying the band pass ﬁlter. Note that the ﬁltered
trace from the EM probe looks very similar to the ﬁltered trace from the trace taken
with the current probe; this is most likely due to the signals coming from the same
source, which is the IF port.

Before we perform DEMA on the ﬁltered trace set, we ran the KnownKeyCorrelation module on the trace set. Figure 36 shows the result of running the KnownKeyCorrelation on the ﬁltered trace set. The result shown is once again Hamming
Weight of SBox out, and each trace shows the correlation between the key bytes and
the trace set. We can see that the key bytes correlate to the ﬁrst round’s Hamming
Weight of the SBox out between 0.9ms and 1.5ms; the correlation between the key
bytes and the second round’s Hamming Weight of the SBox out is between 2.0ms and
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3.0ms, and the third round is between 3.0ms and 4.0ms. If we compare the result
of the KnownKeyCorrelation between the EM trace set and the trace set with the
current probe shown in ﬁgure 36 and ﬁgure 34 respectively, we can see that the EM
trace set have a much stronger correlation between the key bytes and the trace sets.
This is merely a demonstration of how a stronger correlation looks like as there are
0.7M more traces to perform the known key correlation in this trace set than the one
presented in ﬁgure 34.

Since the result of the KnownKeyCorrelation shows a strong correlation between
the key bytes and the trace set, we expect a full key recovery if not near full key
recovery. The key we recovered from the performing DEMA on the trace set is the
following: 524953435552454953f74f4f4c2131f0. Examining the recovered key bytes
shown that only 2 key bytes are incorrect. Recall that we recovered 15 bytes of the
key with 4 million traces on the normal set up, so the number of traces needed to
recover most of the key is consistence with previous results.

In summary, we recover 15 bytes of the key bytes with the set up with the Icom up
to 3.5 million traces, and this is comparable to the previous results without the Icom.
None of key bytes was recovered from performing DEMA on trace sets resampled
to 4.15MHz, 10.742MHz, and 17.334MHz. This is consistence with the previous
experiment of performing DPA with the Icom by resampling to these frequencies,
and the two results highly suggests the information leakage is hidden in combination
of the 10.742MHz and 17.334MHz frequencies. Overall, the set up with the Icom
is a possible alternative set up for the normal set up. Since the signal has been
downshifted from a higher frequency down to below 20MHz, performing a DEMA
will require less samples per traces. This implies less calculation is needed in order to
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perform DEMA on a target. It is possible that we can use the set up with the Icom
for target operating at a higher frequency for downshifting in order to improve the
eﬃciency of performing DEMA, but further research will needed to be done in order
to conﬁrm such claim. In the next section, we will discuss the results of using the set
up with the Icom in diﬀerent conﬁgurations.

11.4

DPA with the Icom with other conﬁgurations

In this section, we will show the results of applying diﬀerent conﬁgurations to the set
up with the Icom. The set ups are current probe with no impedance matcher, current
probe with AC coupling and no impedance matcher, and ﬁnally, current probe with
AC coupling and no impedance matcher and Icom tuned to 65.43MHz. The reason
for applying these conﬁgurations is to see if we can apply diﬀerent conﬁgurations to
improve the performance of performing DPA/DEMA with the Icom.

The ﬁrst conﬁguration is simply remove the impedance matcher. Recall that we
place a 50 Ohms impedance matcher between the Icom and the LeCroy in order to
prevent the Icom from overloading the scope with current. However, the impedance
matcher will cause some signal loss between the Icom and the scope, and this can
potentially distort the captured signal enough that the information leakage is no
longer within the signal [33]. In order to verify that the impedance matcher is not
interfering with our experiment, we used a multimeter to check that the current
coming out of the IF will not overload the LeCroy. Hence, it is safe to connect the
IF port directly to the scope without the impedance matcher. We took 150k traces
with the Icom directly connected to the impedance matcher since only 80k traces are
needed to perform full key recovery on the normal set up. We performed DPA on the
aligned trace set sampled at 1GHz, but zero key byte was recovery from the trace set.
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In addition, we resampled the trace set to 10.742MHz and 17.334MHz and performed
DPA on the resampled trace sets with no success. We once again applied a band
pass ﬁlter of 5MHz to 25MHz to the trace set, then we ran the KnownKeyCorrelation
module on the ﬁltered trace set, and ﬁgure 37 shows the results of running the module.
From the ﬁgure, we can see that there is little to no correlation between the key bytes
and the trace set on the ﬁrst round, and absolutely no correlation between the key
bytes and the trace set on the second round. Thus, the 50 Ohms impedance matcher
is not a negative factor in our experiments.

Figure 37: Known key correlation on 150k PWC traces with Icom and no impedance
matcher

The next conﬁguration is to use the current probe with no impedance matcher and
set the LeCroy scope to AC coupling with 1M Ohms impedance. If the scope is set to
DC coupling, the actual signal is measured; if the scope is set to AC coupling, then
the DC component of the signal is removed from the trace after a high pass ﬁlter is
applied. By removing the DC component of the signal, we increase the resolution of
the signal [34]. Figure 38 shows sample traces of both DC coupling and AC coupling.
Note that the signal range for the trace with DC coupling is at -/+20mV, and the
signal range for the trace with AC coupling is at -/+50mV. Figure 39 shows sample
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trace captured during the entire AES operations; the top trace is unﬁltered sampled
at 1GHz, and the bottom trace is resampled to 17.334MHz. Note that the resampled
trace shown more distinguishable AES operations (e.g. input/output operations and
AES encryption) as we have seen in section 9.3.1 in the trace compared to the traces
in ﬁgure 32. The input and put operations can easily be identiﬁed, and the AES
encryption operations are between 10ms and 22ms. However, zero byte of the key
was recovered from performing DPA on the aligned trace set resampled at 1GHz.
In addition, none of the key bytes was recovered from trace sets with 150k traces
resampled to 10.742MHz and 17.334MHz. The trace set applied with a 5MHz to
25MHz band pass ﬁlter also recovered zero bytes of the key. Thus, the DC coupling
setting is also not a negative factor in our experiments.

Figure 38: Sample traces with current probe and Icom; DC coupling on top; AC
coupling on bottom

The last conﬁguration we tried is to set the Icom to tune to 65.43MHz. Recall that
this 65.43MHz frequency is the upper harmonic frequency of the operating frequency
of the Xmega. In the experiments we conduct earlier, we see that the trace set
resampled to 65.43MHz shown similar, if not better, DPA results than trace set
resampled to 32.71MHz. Thus, it is worth while to attempt to take traces with
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Figure 39: Sample traces of all AES operations with current probe and AC coupling
at 1GHz; unﬁltered on top; 17.334MHz resampling on bottom
the Icom tuned to 65.43MHz. This set up also has no impedance matcher and the
scope is set for AC coupling. Figure 40 shows a sample trace taken with this set up.
Unfortunately, zero byte of the key was recovered from the aligned trace set sampled
at 1GHz. In addition, performing DPA on trace set resampled at 10.742MHz and
17.334MHz and trace set applied with band pass ﬁltered ranged from 5MHz to 25MHz
recovered zero bytes of the key up to 100k traces. Therefore, tuning the Icom to the
upper harmonic did not improve the eﬃciency on DPA.

Figure 40: Sample trace with current probe and Icom tuned for 65.43MHz

Although this is not a conﬁguration, this last experiment we ran was to cover all
of our basis to make sure we did not miss anything. Recall that we perform the
band pass ﬁlter from 5MHz to 25MHz in all of our experiments in this section, so
the 4.15MHz frequency in the signals was eliminated from the trace sets. For all the
trace set that we obtained in this section, we run the band pass ﬁlter and perform
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DPA on all of them again, but the band pass ﬁlter is from 1.5MHz to 25MHz instead.
The DPA performed on these ﬁltered trace sets did not produce any byte of the key.
Therefore, the 4.15MHz frequency did not contribute to the information leakage.

11.5

Summary of the Downshifting with Icom

In this section, we experimented DPA and DEMA with a slightly diﬀerent set up.
We place an Icom R7000 radio frequency receiver between the probes and the LeCroy
oscilloscope. The Icom served as a signal downmixer, and it shifts high frequency
signals down to a mere 10.742MHz. By shifting the signal down to 10.742MHz, we
can reduce the number of calculation during DPA and DEMA and thus improve their
eﬃciencies.

The results of our experiment show that the downshifting does not improve the
eﬃciency of DPA with the current probe. The number of traces needed for full key
recovery increased from 80k to 2.8 million traces. On the other hands, we produced
similar results for DEMA with the downshifting experiments. Fourteen bytes of key
were recovered from performing DEMA on 3.5 millions traces taken with the Icom,
and ﬁfteen bytes of the key were recovered from performing DEMA on 4 millions
traces taken with the normal set up. Thus, it is possible to increase the eﬃciency of
DEMA using this downshifting technique.
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CHAPTER 12
Comparison between DPA and DEMA
Several experiments were perform on the Xmega in regards to side channel attacks. In sections 9.3.1 and 9.4.1, we began with measuring the Xmega with the EM
probe, and we began taking measurments of the Xmega’s change in voltage while it
is performing AES encryption in section 10.2. Finally, we took measurements of the
Xmega with the current probe while it is performing AES encryption in section 10. In
addition, we performed experiments where we used a radio receiver as a demodulator
in section 11.2. Table 9 shows the best results of each experiments.
Model
Frequency Traces Downshift Correct Key Bytes
EM@L1 65.43MHz
3.1M
No
11
EM@L2 32.71MHz
225k
No
15
EM@L2 65.43MHz
125k
No
15
EM@L2 130.86MHz 150k
No
9
PWR
32.71MHz
0.5M
No
0
PWR
65.43MHz
0.5M
No
0
PWR
1GHz
2.5M
No
16
PWC
32.71MHz
45k
No
16
PWC
65.43MHz
100k
No
16
PWC
1GHz
40k
No
15
EM@L1
1GHz*
3.5M
Yes
14
PWC
1GHz*
2.8M
Yes
16
Table 9: Summary of all experiments with best results; PWR denotes power/resistor,
and PWC denotes power/current; * = band pass ﬁltered from 5MHz to 25MHz

12.1

Summary of DEMA

We began by examining the results of the experiments conducted with the EM
probe. In our experiments, we placed the EM probe at two diﬀerent locations. Location 1, or L1 for short, is located near the center of the chip, and location 2, or
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L2 for short, is located on the edge of the chip. We chose these two locations based
on the Spectral Intensity graph shown in ﬁgure 8. The ﬁgure shows that L1 and L2
have the highest amount of activities at the 32MHz frequency, with a bandwidth of
-/+0.2MHz, while performing AES encryption operations.

The ﬁrst experiment we conducted with the EM probe is at location 1. This location
was chosen ﬁrst since it is most likely where the cryptographic engine is located based
on the schematic diagrams. We set the LeCroy oscilloscope to sample at 1 GHz. The
signals from the EM probe can ranged from -/+500mV to -/+3V depending on how
far the probe is away from the Xmega; these signals is much stronger compared to
the current probe and the signals from measuring the change in voltage. Note that
only 27000 samples per trace is needed in order to capture the entire AES encryption
operation sampled at 1 GHz, and this holds true for all the experiments conducted
with the Xmega. While we measured the Xmega with both the high sensitivity and
low sensitivity probes, the results discussed in this section will only consists of traces
taken with the high sensitivity probe.

At location 1, we were able to captured up to 3.1 million traces with the high
sensitivity probe. We resampled these 3.1 million traces to 32.71MHz and 65.43MHz,
which are the operating frequency of the Xmega and the upper harmonic, and we performed DEMA on these resampled trace sets. The trace sets resampled at 32.71MHz
recovered up to 10 bytes of the key with 1.5 million traces and recovered up to 10 bytes
with 3.1 million traces. On the other hands, the trace sets resampled at 65.43MHz
recovered up to 12 bytes with 1.5 million traces and recovered up to 11 bytes with 3.1
million traces. Since doubling the amount of traces shows no improvement in number
of key bytes recovered, we looked for an alternative source of leakage, and that is
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location 2.

Location 2 is located on the edge of the chip, and we believed this location is where
the input/output operations are being conducted for the chip. Regardless of what we
believed which functions are located on the chip, the leakage information of the key
exists in location 2 as well. We were able to capture up to 4 millions traces at location
2. By resampled to the trace set down to 32.71MHz, we were able to recover up to
15 bytes of the key with 225k traces. Furthermore, we were able to recover up to 15
bytes of the key with 125k traces with the trace set resampled down to 65.43MHz.
However, we were not able to recover the last byte of the key even using up all 4
million traces. Note that there are twice as many samples per trace in the trace set
resampled to 65.43MHz compared to the samples per trace in the trace set resampled
to 32.71MHz, so the amount of time to perform DEMA on 125k traces resampled to
65.43MHz is about the same as the amount of time to perform DEMA on 225k traces
resampled to 32.71MHz.

12.2

Summary of DPA

In terms of DPA, we conducted the experiments in two ways. The ﬁrst way is to
place a resistor on the ground wire of the chip, and we measure the change in voltage
across the resistor as the Xmega performs AES encryption. The second way is simply
place a current probe on the VCC wire of the Xmega, and we measure the signal
from the current probe. Once again, the LeCroy was set to sample at 1 GHz, and the
signals ranged within the -/+ 100mV with a 12V ampliﬁer placed between the scope
and the probes in both cases. The signal strength of the current and power probe
is much weaker compared to the signals from the EM probe. The signal strength of
the EM is based on the distance between the probe and the target. In our case, we
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placed the probe about 1mm away from the target. However, the signals from the
current probe and measured across the resistor shown much better results than the
signals from the EM probe regardless of the strength of the signals.

We began DPA with measuring the change in voltage across the resistor placed
on the ground wire of the Xmega. This method of doing DPA will depend on the
resistance of the resistor. A stronger resistor will give a stronger signal to perform
DPA on, but the stronger resistor has a higher chance of causing failure on the Xmega.
Luckily, we did not encounter any calculation error from the Xmega cause by placing
resistor as strong as 1M Ohm. We began with measuring across a 1k Ohm resistor,
and we managed to capture 1.5 million traces with this set up. Initial attempts at
performing DPA with trace set resampled to 32.71MHz and 65.43MHz showed no
result up to 0.5 million traces, so we perform DPA on the unﬁltered traces sampled
at 1 GHz. We recovered 8 bytes of the key with 1 million traces, and we recovered 14
bytes of the key with 1.5 million traces. Afterward, we tested the eﬀects of using a
stronger resistor, and we replaced the 1k Ohm resistor with a 1M Ohm resistor. We
were able to capture 4 million traces with the 1M Ohm resistor for our experiments.
At 1M traces, this trace set taken with the 1M Ohm resistor was able to recover 13
bytes of the key and was able to recover 15 bytes of the key with 1.5M traces. This
was a sign of improvement over the 1k Ohm resistor. At the end, we did not need
all 4 million traces to perform a full key recovery, and we only needed 2.5 million
traces. This result was already an improvement over DEMA since we never managed
to perform a full key recovery with DEMA.

The next set of experiments was measuring the current on the VCC wire of the
Xmega while it is performing AES encryptions. In addition, a battery power source
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was used in place of the DC lab power supply that we were using in the previous
experiments. The signals captured with this set up is even weaker than the set up
with the resistor, and the range of the signal with this set up is in the -/+10mV
without an ampliﬁer. On the other hands, this set up proved to be most eﬀective
among all the other experiment that we have conducted. Trace set resampled from 1
GHz down to 32.71MHz is used to perform DPA, and only 45k traces are needed to
perform full key recovery. In addition, trace set resampled to 65.43MHz only required
100k traces to perform full key recovery. The First Order Stats module shown that
only 80k traces are needed to guarantee full key recovery. Over all, using the current
probe seems to be the best method in performing side channel attack on an embedded
system.

Lastly, we will brieﬂy mention about the experiments with using a radio receiver
as a demodulator. In this experiment, we performed the experiments with the EM
probe and the current probe with an addition component to the set up. We placed
an Icom R7000 radio receiver between the probes and the LeCroy. The radio receiver
was tuned to the operation frequency of the Xmega at 32.71MHz, and the LeCroy
was connected to the Icom via the IF port. The IF port always produces a 10.74MHz
signal. In summary, we were able to recover 14 bytes of the key with 3.5 million EM
traces taken at L1, and we were able to recover all key bytes with 2.8 million traces
taken with the current probe. In terms of performance, the set up with the Icom is
comparable for EM, but the set up with the Icom is no improvement for the current
probe. It is a possible alternative set up for EM.
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12.3

DEMA vs DPA

We will compare the perform of DEMA and DPA with and without the Icom. We
will begin with the case without the Icom. In section 12.1, we concluded that the
best result for performing DEMA on the Xmega is to acquire traces at location 2
presented in ﬁgure 8. We shown that the time it takes to perform DEMA on 125k
traces resampled to 65.43MHz is the same amount of time it takes to perform DEMA
on 225k traces resampled to 32.71MHz, and this will allow us to recover all bytes
of the key. The said time is 1 hour on a 3.0GHz machine. However, it takes 45
minutes to acquire 125k traces, and it takes 1.5 hour to acquire 225k traces. Thus,
the best strategy, time wise, for performing DEMA on the Xmega is to acquire 125k
traces on location 2 with the HS probe, and perform analysis on trace set resampled to
65.43MHz. The total time for DEMA with this strategy will be 1 hour and 45 minutes
on a 3.0GHz machine. On the other hands, we mentioned that the best strategy for
performing DPA is to acquire 80k traces using the current probe in section 12.2. The
total time for performing DPA with this strategy is 1 hour on a 3.0GHz machine.
Thus, DPA has a 45 minutes gain in full key recovery over DEMA in term of time
performance. The diﬀerence in number of traces is 45k in favor of DPA. According
to our data, DPA 50 percent faster than DEMA in the case with the traditional
methods. Thus, an attack should perform DPA with the current probe for the best
perform time wise with the least amount of traces.

In section 11.2, we performed DEMA/DPA with the Icom as a downmixer. In
section 12.2, we mentioned that 3.5 millions EM traces were taken at location 1, but
only 14 bytes of the key were recovered. Time wise, it takes 4 days to acquire 3.5
millions traces, and it takes 1 day to analysis the aligned trace set sampled at 1GHz
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to produce the 14 bytes key recovery on a 3.0GHz machine. Thus, the total time it
takes to perform DEMA with only 14 bytes of key recovered is 5 days. On the other
hands, full key recover was performed with DPA by acquiring traces with the current
probe. This was done with 2.8 millions aligned traces sampled at 1GHz, and it takes
3 days for the acquisition to complete. Furthermore, the analysis phase takes 1 day
to complete. Thus, the total time to perform full key analysis with the current probe
and the Icom is 4 days on a 3.0GHz machine. The total gain in time for DPA over
DEMA with the Icom is 1 day, and the DPA need 0.7 million less traces than DEMA
with the Icom. With the Icom, DPA is still faster than DEMA, but DPA is only
faster by 20 percent according to our data. In both case with and without the Icom,
DPA with the current probe is best method in performing full key recovery on the
Xmega.

85

CHAPTER 13
Conclusion

Side channel attack is an emerging ﬁeld of studies in computer hardware designs.
Side channel attacks can allow attackers to obtain the secrets hidden inside hardware
without attacking the logic behind the cryptographic algorithms. There are many
forms of side channel attacks; temperature and sound based side channel attacks are
some examples. Some of the more complex side channel attacks are Diﬀerential Power
Analysis (DPA) and Diﬀerential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA). They are statistical attacks that require the use of power or electromagnetic traces of the target while
it is perform cryptographic operations. A power or electromagnetic trace consists of
the voltage or current readings of the target in respected to time. Given enough
traces, an attacker can determine the secret key that is hidden in the hardware.

In this paper, we performed DPA and DEMA on an ATXmega256A3B microcontroller, and it is a popular series of microcontroller that is used in many places. We
chose the ATXmega256A3B microcontroller as our target because it is capable of
performing AES encryption and decryption on the hardware level. The goal of this
paper is to compare the eﬀectiveness of DPA and DEMA on embedded system such
as the ATXmega256A3B microcontroller. In terms of raw strength, the EM probe
was able to produce a much stronger signal than the current probe. For DEMA, we
used a high sensitivity EM probe to obtain traces, and we were one byte short of
full key recovery with 125k traces. On the other hands, only 45k traces were needed
to perform full key recovery using a current probe. Thus, while the EM probe can
produce stronger signals, the signals capture by the EM probe can also be very noisy
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compared to the current probe. Overall, DPA with the current probe is more eﬀective
than DEMA with the results that we produced.

In addition to the comparing the eﬀectiveness of DPA and DEMA on embedded
system, we also performed experiment with using a radio receiver as a signal demodulator. The radio receiver will take any signal and shifts it down to a mere 10.7MHz
signal. This downshifting can reduce the number of calculations needed to perform
DPA and DEMA. Once again, the number of traces needed to perform DPA was
recorded to be less than that of number of traces needed for DEMA. Thus, the downshifting experiments reinforced the claim that DPA is more eﬀective than DEMA. On
the other hands, we also found that the set up with the radio receiver serving as a
downmixer could potentially be used as an alternative to the traditional DEMA set
up, but further research would need be conducted to verify this claim.
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APPENDIX A
AES driver

// \brief Polled function that does an AES encryption on one 128-bit data
block.
// \note This code is blocking and will dead lock if no interrupt flags
are set.
// \param plaintext Pointer to the plaintext that shall be encrypted
// \param ciphertext Pointer to where in memory the ciphertext (answer)
shall be stored.
// \param key

Pointer to the AES key

// \retval true If the AES encryption was successful.
// \retval false If the AES encryption was not successful.
bool AES_encrypt(uint8_t * plaintext, uint8_t * ciphertext, uint8_t * key)
{
bool encrypt_ok;

/* Load key into AES key memory. */
uint8_t * temp_key = key;
for(uint8_t i = 0; i < AES_BLOCK_LENGTH; i++){
AES.KEY = *(temp_key++);
}
/* Load data into AES state memory. */
uint8_t * temp_plaintext = plaintext;
for(uint8_t i = 0; i < AES_BLOCK_LENGTH; i++){
AES.STATE = *(temp_plaintext++);
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}
/* Set AES in encryption mode and start AES. */
AES.CTRL = (AES.CTRL & (~AES_DECRYPT_bm)) | AES_START_bm;
PORTC.OUT |= (1<<1) | 0x01; //Begin HW trigger
do{
/* Wait until AES is finished or an error occurs. */
}while((AES.STATUS & (AES_SRIF_bm|AES_ERROR_bm) ) == 0);
PORTC.OUTCLR |= (1<<1); //Clear HW trigger
/* If not error. */
if((AES.STATUS & AES_ERROR_bm) == 0){
/* Store the result. */
uint8_t * temp_ciphertext = ciphertext;
for(uint8_t i = 0; i < AES_BLOCK_LENGTH; i++){
*(temp_ciphertext++) = AES.STATE;
}
encrypt_ok = true;
}else{
encrypt_ok = false;
}
return encrypt_ok;
}
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APPENDIX B
AES run

/* Key used when AES encryption is done operations. */
uint8_t key[BLOCK_LENGTH] = {0x52, 0x49, 0x53, 0x43, 0x55, 0x52, 0x45,
0x49,
0x53, 0x43, 0x4F, 0x4F, 0x4C, 0x21, 0x31, 0x00};

uint8_t lastsubkey[BLOCK_LENGTH];
uint8_t read_key[BLOCK_LENGTH];

/* Variable used to check if decrypted answer is equal original data. */
bool success;

int main(void) {
int data;
int index=0;
char buffer[BLOCK_LENGTH];
Config32MHzClock();
CLK.PSCTRL = 0x00; // no division on peripheral clock
PORTC.DIR |= (1<<1);
PORTCFG.CLKEVOUT = PORTCFG_CLKOUT_PE7_gc;
PORTE.DIR = (1<<7); // clkout

// configure PORTF, USARTF0 (PORTF:3=Tx, PORTF:2=Rx) as asynch
serial port
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// This will connect to the USB-Serial chip on EVAL-USB boards
// For other boards rewrite all occurences of USARTF0 below with
USARTE0
// then you can use PORTE:2,3 as asynch serial port (EVAL-01,
EVAL-04 boards)
PORTF.DIR |= (1<<3) | (1<<0); // set PORTF:3 transmit pin as output
PORTF.OUT |= (1<<3);

// set PORTF:3 hi

USARTF0.BAUDCTRLA = 207; // 9600b (BSCALE=207,BSEL=0)
USARTF0.CTRLB = USART_TXEN_bm | USART_RXEN_bm; // enable tx and rx
on USART
while(1) {
data=UsartReadChar(); // read char
if(index==sizeof(buffer)-1) {
buffer[index]=data;
index=0;

// null terminate
// reset buffer index

DoAES(buffer);
} else {
buffer[index++]=data;
};
};
};

void DoAES(char plaintext[]) {
/* Variables used to store the result from a single AES
encryption/decryption .*/
uint8_t single_ans1[BLOCK_LENGTH];
/* Assume that everything is ok*/
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success = true;
/* Before using the AES it is recommended to do an AES software
reset to put
* the module in known state, in case other parts of your code has
accessed
* the AES module. */
AES_software_reset();
AES_interruptlevel_set(1);
/* Generate last subkey. */
AES_lastsubkey_generate(key, lastsubkey);
success = AES_encrypt(plaintext, single_ans1, key); //Call
AES_driver.c for encryption
if(success) {
UsartWriteChar(0x00); //For Inspector’s protocal
UsartWriteChar(0x10);
UsartWriteDatabytes(single_ans1);
} else {
UsartWriteString("Failed to encrypt\n");
}
}

void UsartWriteDatabytes(char *string) {
int i;
for(i=0;i<BLOCK_LENGTH;i++) {
UsartWriteChar(*string++);
}
};
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void UsartWriteChar(unsigned char data) {
USARTF0.DATA = data; // transmit ascii 3 over and over
if(!(USARTF0.STATUS&USART_DREIF_bm))
while(!(USARTF0.STATUS & USART_TXCIF_bm)); // wait for TX
complete
USARTF0.STATUS |= USART_TXCIF_bm; // clear TX interrupt flag
};

unsigned char UsartReadChar(void) {
while(!(USARTF0.STATUS&USART_RXCIF_bm)); // wait for RX complete
return USARTF0.DATA;
};

// write out a simple ’\0’ terminated string
void UsartWriteString(char *string) {
while(*string != 0) UsartWriteChar(*string++);
};

void Config32MHzClock(void) {
CCP = CCP_IOREG_gc; //Security Signature to modify clock
// initialize clock source to be 32MHz internal oscillator (no PLL)
OSC.CTRL = OSC_RC32MEN_bm; // enable internal 32MHz oscillator
while(!(OSC.STATUS & OSC_RC32MRDY_bm)); // wait for oscillator ready
CCP = CCP_IOREG_gc; //Security Signature to modify clock
CLK.CTRL = CLK_SCLKSEL_RC32M_gc; //select sysclock 32MHz osc
// update baud rate control to match new clk
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USARTF0.BAUDCTRLA = 207; // 9600b (BSCALE=207,BSEL=0)
};
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